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This dissertation addresses the implications of growing globalization, digitalization, and health concern 
for the collective welfare of consumers. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the burning questions 
engendered by these trends. Chapter 2 examines unethical behavior and analyzes how foreign versus 
native language contexts shape opportunistic lying. Chapter 3 investigates consumers’ interests 
in recommendations of novel products and reveals how user- versus item-based framings impact 
click-throughs of automated recommendations. Chapter 4 focuses on the choice and consumption 
of unhealthy food and compares the influence of the timing of choice versus individual differences 
in eating habits on unhealthy eating. These essays contribute to the understanding of consumer 
dishonesty, provide a marketing solution to the bias of algorithmic recommendations, and diagnose 
an understudied self-control problem. Chapter 5 discusses the theoretical and practical insights across 
these essays and lays out the questions for future research. 
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The goal of my dissertation is to examine the issues, arising from globalization, 
digitalization, and health threats, that are consequential to the collective welfare of 
consumers. These issues are embedded in the trends that contextualize consumers but have 
gathered little attention in the literature. In this chapter, I provide an overview of each of 
the trends and elaborate on the issues that are tied to consumer welfare and await 
investigation. Then I introduce the three essays and discuss the theoretical and practical 
relevance of each of them.  
The Trends That Contextualize Consumers 
The topics covered in this book reflect the age that contextualizes the author and 
many other consumers. They live in a globalized world, where many people can speak 
multiple languages and travel across language barriers in no time. A bi- or multi-lingual 
consumer is constantly switching between different language channels for various 
purposes. She might fill out a consumer survey in her second language and then shop on a 
website in her first language. She might watch TV shows in her second language as well as 
movies in her first language. Whether a company presents the content in English or the 
local language of the consumer, she can navigate the online world and find what she 
wants. The seamless shifts from one language context to the other and vice versa could 
make one wonder whether a consumer always behaves the same way in different 
languages. We know from the past research that the language a consumer speaks 
determines the way she makes sense of brand and product names (Luna and Peracchio 
2001), serves as a cue for her memories established in that language context (Puntoni, de 
Langhe, and van Osselaer 2009), and represents a certain set of cultural values that 
regulates her public self (Lee, Oyserman and Bond 2010). Apparently, language contexts 
do pose influences on individual consumers, shaping the way they think and behave, either 
for or against their own benefit. For instance, while the brand name associations can be an 
irrational factor in consumers’ product choices (Wu et al. 2019), the reduced emotional 
attachment to products and resources can make consumers more rational in transactions 
(Keysar, Hayakawa, and An 2012).  
Consumers nowadays also live in a digitalized world, where the cost of finding and 




Thanks to the development of algorithms, personalized recommendations are not reserved 
for luxury consumers anymore but available to anyone who has left their traces of interests 
and behaviors in the online world. A consumer today does not have to visit brick-and-
mortar music or video shops to discover their favorites; instead, a long list of songs or 
videos is automatically generated and regularly updated by the algorithm, awaiting for her 
exploration at just one click away. The consumer does not have to tell the salesperson what 
she likes or dislikes in the hope to get more accurate recommendations; she can 
communicate her tastes with algorithms by merely clicking on the like or skip button. The 
consumer does not have to spend hours deliberating over which product to choose but can 
rely on algorithms to provide a suggestion for her to follow. With more companies 
adopting recommender systems, numerous studies have looked at how to make 
recommendations perform better, in terms of consumers evaluation of the recommended 
products (e.g., Ying, Feinberg, and Wedel 2006), their trust in (Cramer et al. 2008) or 
interaction with the recommender system (Zhao 2017). These studies primarily focus on 
the design of recommendation algorithms, attributing consumer reactions to the products 
being recommended and the underlying system. 
Aside from globalization and digitalization, consumers are more inflicted by self-
regulation problems than ever. Affluence and abundance of food, once a blessing to 
consumers living in the age of scarcity, now engender problems such as obesity that 
threaten the health of consumers. According to the World Health Organization (2016), 
more than 1.9 billion people around the world are overweight. The epidemic arises not 
only in the developed world but also in developing countries because of the rising GDPs 
(Lappo et al. 2015). In response to this acute health crisis, a significant amount of research 
has been devoted to the development of interventions to curb unhealthy eating. As a result, 
food marketing and packaging of junk food are increasingly regulated worldwide (Kovic 
2019; WCRF 2017); taxes are imposed on unhealthy food and drinks and subsidies on the 
healthy ones (Powell and Chaloupka 2009). Besides strict policies, benevolent nudges 
have also been implemented to restaurant menus and cafeteria layout, with the purpose to 
facilitate consumers to make wiser choices. For instance, calories are explicitly labeled, 
and traffic lights attached to food options indicating the health value (VanEpps, Downs, 




unhealthy are moved further away (Rozin et al. 2011). In marketing, particular attention 
has been paid to the health-taste tradeoff between healthy and unhealthy food. Researchers 
frequently contrast the healthy yet less tasty food with the tempting unhealthy food as 
“virtues” versus “vices” and endeavor to understand what drives consumers to select the 
virtue over the vice food.  
The Potential to Improve the Collective Welfare of Consumers 
The phenomena discussed above, the multilingual contexts, the availability of 
automated recommendations, and the relapse of control in food consumption, have been 
popular areas of inquiries in the last two decades. Although none of these has been 
researched exhaustively and the current understanding is far from comprehensive, I see one 
void of research particularly worth notice. That is, the consequences of these binding 
phenomena on consumers as a collective. I suggest that past research in these contexts has 
focused much on behaviors that benefit individual consumers but overlooked questions 
that pertain to consumers as a collective. This dissertation is intended to address some of 
these questions.  
I identify three cases in which the collective welfare of consumers is undermined, 
giving rise to the questions that are relevant to the trends discussed above and ready to be 
addressed by consumer research. First, the decision of an individual consumer may be 
beneficial to herself at the cost of fellow consumers. Such unethical decisions are 
frequently manifest in the actions of consumers, but even more in their words. One 
example is opportunistic lying. Dishonest consumers, by taking advantage of the trust of 
companies, reap the benefits from their fellow consumers and potentially elevate prices of 
services and products to all consumers. As a linguistic product, the lies of consumers, 
however, have rarely been examined against their language contexts. Research on bilingual 
consumers has primarily looked at behaviors that do not harm others yet paid very limited 
attention to those that concern collective welfare. How does language influence behaviors 
such as opportunistic lying that is rational yet unfair to other consumers? Is there any 
regularity and why does language affect consumer dishonesty? Chapter 2 is intended to 




Second, utility maximization for each individual consumer may paradoxically 
undermine the collective benefit due to invisible forces. This is precisely what happens to 
algorithmic recommendations. Although algorithms strive to recommend new products to 
each individual, because they typically favor products that have been viewed or consumed 
more frequently, the same set of popular products might be recommended to many 
consumers and the overall diversity of consumption be constrained (Fleder and Hosanagar 
2009). This means that even when every consumer receives something new, there remains 
a huge stock of products that consumers might find interesting but never get the chance to 
see. To solve this problem, past research has been concentrated on the backstage design of 
recommender systems and conceptualizes the problem as an algorithmic trade-off between 
accuracy and diversity (Adomavicius and Kwon 2012, 2014). The role of marketing, or the 
management of the front-end communication with consumers, appears marginal (if not 
absent) in this realm. Nevertheless, it is possible for marketing to make a unique and 
important contribution by offering a way to attract consumers towards recommendations of 
unfamiliar or unpopular products, such that the overall diversity of consumption can be 
enhanced. Chapter 3 introduces the framing of recommendations as a marketing tool to 
achieve this goal and suggests that it is not just how the algorithm is designed but also how 
it is explained to consumers that matters.  
Finally, consumer welfare cannot be maximized when research disproportionately 
focuses on a specific choice setting or population. The research on choices between 
healthy and unhealthy food categories leaves out a substantial group of consumers who 
end up choosing within a specific category, especially those who decide to enjoy vice food. 
These consumers not only deserve the right to derive pleasure from their favorite food but 
merit more attention from researchers to understand their self-control processes within the 
vice category. Importantly, even within the vice category, consumers are frequently 
offered ‘lesser vices’ that are less harmful to their health, such as Diet Coke. What is the 
dynamic of choosing between the vice and the lesser vice? Are findings from vice–lesser 
choices applicable to vice–lesser vice settings? What does the success of self-control mean 
in the vice–lesser vice setting? Chapter 4 presents a first attempt to conceptualize self-
control dynamics when consumers are confronted with options within the vice category 




To recap, this dissertation is aimed at addressing the questions related to consumer 
welfare in the current age. As summarized in Figure 1, it presents the investigations of 1) 
the influence of language on opportunistic lying (Chapter 2), 2) the role of marketing 
communication in consumer interests in product recommendations (Chapter 3), and 3) the 
choice and consumption of lesser vices (Chapter 4). It is worth noting that, although the 
questions raised in this book are oriented towards the collective welfare of consumers, they 
do not conflict, but dovetail, with the interest of companies. The findings presented in this 
book provide practical insights regarding how to manage the dishonesty of bilingual 
consumers to prevent companies’ losses, how to market ‘long-tail’ products without 
overspending on algorithm development, and how to effectively market lesser vices. The 
ultimate goal of this dissertation is to invite more research on consumer welfare that 
benefits companies at the same time. In the remainder of this chapter, I provide a detailed 
overview of chapters 2 to 4. Chapter 5 will zoom out of the specific questions addressed in 
each chapter and discuss the overall implications across the chapters. Instead of reiterating 
the precise implications for the theories and practice, Chapter 5 will focus on the routes to 
be taken to broaden the current understanding of contextual influences on consumer 
welfare. 
 







Chapter 2: Language and Consumer Dishonesty 
Consumers lie and cheat, in domains as diverse as insurance claims, product returns, 
dating profiles, and tax declarations. When signing up for online services, for example, 
they often lie about their birthdays to be eligible for discounts (Johnson 2015). Consumer 
dishonesty produces substantial costs: Automobile insurance fraud costs U.S. companies 
more than $5 billion annually and prompts significantly higher premiums for all consumers 
(Insurance Research Council 2012). Although most consumers lie in their native language 
(L1), they also lie in their second language (L2): Travelers misreport information when 
they fill out lost-luggage forms; immigrants fail to disclose medical conditions to health 
insurers; and overseas consumers claim discounts by faking their online identities. Most 
people in the world speak more than one language, and the number of multilingual people 
is increasing (Grosjean 2010). Therefore, it is important for consumer researchers to 
understand how language shapes lying behavior.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of language (L2 vs. L1) on lying. Nine studies, 
spanning several languages and consumption domains, challenge the findings of recent 
psychological research that indicate second language use leads to lower rates of lying. 
Second language use does not lead uniformly to more honesty but rather attenuates 
people’s intuitive preferences for lying or telling the truth. Furthermore, stronger intuitive 
tendencies for (dis)honesty magnify the language effect, and increased feelings of 
uncertainty in second language contexts contribute to the effect of language on consumer 
dishonesty. These nuanced findings highlight the fact that language contexts do not 
automatically activate or inhibit dishonest behavior. Instead, it is the interaction between 
the moral intuitions that are at least partially established in the native language context and 
the uncertainty embedded in using a foreign language that jointly shape the language 
effects.  
Chapter 2 makes three main contributions. First, it contributes to consumer behavior 
and marketing research by linking research on bilingual consumers (e.g., Luna and 
Peracchio 2005)—which has focused mostly on advertising and branding—to research on 




inquiry in recent years; by considering them together, I produce novel insights about a 
topic that has become increasingly important as globalization expands.  
Second, I contribute to the psychological literature on how language influences 
decision making (Hayakawa et al. 2016). Although recent research shows that L2 leads to 
lower rates of lying than L1 (Alempaki, Doğan, and Yang 2017; Bereby-Meyer et al. 
2018), I argue that it is premature to conclude that “honesty speaks a second language” 
(Bereby-Meyer et al. 2018, 1).  I propose that whether L2 use decreases or increases lying 
depends on whether a person’s intuitive L1 response is to be honest or to lie. I demonstrate 
that L2 decreases lying when lying is the intuitive response in L1 contexts, but it increases 
lying when honesty is the intuitive response in L1 contexts. I further propose that an 
important mechanism explaining these effects is that L2 introduces a sense of uncertainty 
that blunts intuitive responses. I thus qualify existing results and show that the effect of 
language on lying can often be the opposite of what previously documented. 
Third, I provide new insights into phenomena that are of great relevance to managers 
and policy makers. Lying occurs in countless occasions, for myriad reasons; I focus on 
opportunistic lying that brings material benefits to consumers. Although lies that bring 
non-material benefits (e.g., impression management) also are common, lying that is 
motivated by material gain is especially relevant to business and society, considering its 
costs to organizations, governments, and honest consumers. I also focus on private lying; 
that is, situations that do not involve face-to-face communication. These conditions 
characterize much of the deceitful consumer behavior that occurs in computer-mediated 
environments. Studying the effect of language under these conditions contributes to the 
understanding of consumer honesty in the digital age. 
Chapter 3: Framing Recommendations to Attract More Click-throughs 
Many companies provide consumers with product recommendations that have been 
generated by algorithmic recommender systems: Spotify and Netflix recommend songs or 
movies for their subscribers, and TripAdvisor and Yelp provide recommendations for 
hotels or restaurants. Amazon suggests which products consumers might want to buy, and 
The New York Times recommends different news articles. These personalized 




their loyalty (Gupta et al. 2006; Kamakura et al. 2005). According to a survey by Spotify, 
65% of consumers find a new favorite song in the personalized playlists they receive 
(Johnson 2015), and Netflix asserts that its recommender system effectively reduces 
consumer churn and saves the company more than $1 billion annually (Gomez-Uribe and 
Hunt 2015).  
To improve the accuracy of these algorithmic recommendations, recommender 
systems frequently adopt a hybrid approach that accounts for both common preferences 
across consumers and common attributes across products (Amatriain and Basilico 2016). 
Each recommendation thus is based on both user and product input; it is not 
straightforward to explain the basis of the recommendation descriptively. Anecdotally, in 
my interviews with members of a major European e-commerce company, the data 
scientists expressed different opinions about whether user or product input best described 
the basis for their recommender system, which actually uses various inputs. In turn, this 
company, and others alike, could choose which component to emphasize when explaining 
how it derives recommendations for consumers. Some companies already highlight that 
their recommendations are user-based by focusing on overlaps in consumer preferences, 
such as “Consumers who viewed this item also viewed…” by Amazon and “Consumers 
also watched…” by Netflix. In contrast, other companies emphasize that recommendations 
are item-based, such as “Similar to [what you have listened to]” by Spotify and “More in 
Health” by The New York Times.  
The question that then arises is which framing, user-based or item-based, is more 
effective in triggering clicks on a recommendation. Such clicks can increase conversion 
rates by stimulating consumers to explore other product offerings (Xu, Duan, and 
Whinston 2014). More importantly, if selecting the proper framing can trigger more clicks 
on recommendations, framing can be effectively used as a tool to attract consumers to 
products that are unpopular or unfamiliar, that is, the ‘long-tail’ products (Anderson 2008). 
This potentially frees the algorithmic constraint on the aggregate diversity of consumed 
products (Adomavicius and Kwon 2014), by mitigating the risk of recommending products 
that have not yet gathered much data and by maximizing the traffic to a variety of products 




Prior research on consumers’ responses to recommendations have focused primarily 
on the underlying recommendation algorithms (Ariely, Lynch, and Aparicio 2004; Hennig-
Thurau, Marchand, and Marx 2012; Ying, Feinberg, and Wedel 2006) or characteristics of 
recommended products (Cooke et al. 2002; Pathak et al. 2010), with limited attention to 
the framing provided to describe the recommendations. This gap is surprising for two main 
reasons. First, many recommendations rely on input from both users and items, so 
companies can choose to highlight different elements. Second, altering recommendation 
framing is a nearly zero-cost effort. To address this gap, I manipulate recommendation 
framing (user-based versus item-based) but keep the underlying algorithms and 
recommended products constant.  
My central proposition is that, compared with item-based framing, user-based framing 
informs consumers that the recommendation is generated through product matching (i.e., 
the recommended product is similar to the focal product) but also indicates taste matching 
between users (i.e., the focal product liked by oneself is also liked by other users). 
Consumers extract information from similar others’ tastes to predict their own liking of 
unfamiliar products (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, and Milyavsky 2011), so this information 
should provide an additional guarantee to consumers that the product will match their 
tastes. Consequently, I predict that recommendations framed as user-based (versus item-
based) attract more click-throughs, conditional on the assumption that consumers perceive 
that a recommendation accurately matches their taste.  
I test my proposition with six studies, which span a variety of data sources (field, 
behavioral, and scenario) and consumption domains (articles, paintings, and books). 
Across these various methods and product domains, I consistently find that user-based 
framing attracts more click-throughs on recommendations than item-based framing when 
consumers perceive that others’ preferences match their own. I further propose three 
boundary conditions that potentially cause the recommendation recipient to perceive the 
taste matching as unsuccessful, so the advantage of user-based framing over item-based 
framing decreases. These boundary conditions in turn offer substantive guidance for 
companies on how to adapt the framing of their recommendations to maximize 




involve products with which consumers are unfamiliar, a design element that establishes 
insights into how to enhance the aggregate diversity of consumption and how to market 
novel products. 
Chapter 4: When virtues are lesser vices 
To overcome overweight and obesity, a significant amount of research has 
investigated drivers of consumers’ choices between healthy and unhealthy food (Hoch and 
Loewenstein 1991; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999), often also referred to as choices between 
virtues and vices (Mishra and Mishra 2011; Wertenbroch 1998). Most self-control research 
on food choices has relied on paradigms where people choose between a healthy and an 
unhealthy option. For instance, consumers may be asked to choose between the fruit salad, 
a supposedly ‘virtue’ and the chocolate cake, a ‘vice’ (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). In 
recent years, however, researchers have started to focus more on vice foods, the leading 
cause of obesity (Cecchini et al. 2010). Examples include consumer choice between two 
vices that differ in visual saliency (Gao, Li, and Wyer 2016) and consumer decision on the 
portion size of vice food (Haws and Winterich 2013).  
Chapter 4 adds to this literature by examining an understudied setting where 
consumers choose between an unhealthy food (e.g., regular chips) and a slightly less 
unhealthy version of that food (e.g., light chips). Instead of choosing between virtues and 
vices, in such situations, consumers are essentially choosing between vices and ‘lesser 
vices’. Practically, studying this context is of great importance as lesser vices abound in 
the marketplace, such as reduced-fat Cheez-it crackers and sugar-free Hershey’s 
chocolates. These products normally contain fewer calories, while aiming to retain 
maximum similarity on the taste dimension with the regular vices.  
The most important contribution of Chapter 4 is to show that choice conflicts between 
vices and lesser vices are characterized by their own dynamics. First, vice–lesser vice 
choices are much less characterized by the gap in short-term gratification. Second, 
differences in caloric density are uniquely salient in the vice–lesser vice choice setting. 
These proposed differences are grounded in goal systems theory and result in two 
predictions. One prediction pertains to the futility of the interventions intended to make the 




popular nudge towards healthy eating, would no longer be able to shift consumers’ 
perspective from short-term gratification to long-term well-being in the vice–lesser vice 
setting. Hence, making food choices well in advance would not increase the choice share 
of lesser vices. In contrast, I predict that consumers who chronically care more about 
calorie intake are more likely to choose lesser vices. The third characteristic of the vice–
lesser vice setting is that consumed quantities matter to the overall success of self-control. 
To this end, I delineate the competing predictions regarding how choices would influence 
consumed quantities.  
To test these propositions, I conducted two experiments, in which the timing of 
choice was manipulated, individual differences in restrained eating (indicating the degree 
of calorie monitoring) measured, and real choices and consumed quantities recorded. The 
studies corroborate the predictions by showing that decoupling the immediate gratification 
from food choices by advance ordering does not encourage consumers to substitute the 
vice with the lesser vice; instead, individual differences in concerns about calorie intake 
encourage the substitution decision. Critically, the studies also demonstrate that consumers 
exert limited control over consumed quantities after they make choices. These findings are 
discussed in relation to previous research and future extensions.  
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This chapter is based on the paper submitted to Journal of Consumer Research on March 
20, 2019: 
Gai, Phyliss Jia and Stefano Puntoni, “Lies of Bilingual Consumers: Foreign Language 
Reduces Intuitive Preferences for (Dis)honesty”, revising for resubmission at Journal 




Chapter 2 is organized as follows. I review research on lying and bilingualism to 
develop a theory of the role of language in dishonesty, and then present the results of eight 
experiments and a meta-regression. The studies document the effects of language in both 
consequential and imagined situations. The investigation spans different languages 
(Chinese, English, French, and Korean) and consumption domains (insurance, flight delay, 
advertising, and lotteries). I conclude with theoretical and practical implications as well as 
methodological limitations. 
Theoretical Background 
Consumer research on lying and bilingualism 
Prior research has examined both consumer lying and bilingualism extensively but 
separately. Researchers have investigated the content of lies (e.g., emotions) (Andrade and 
Ho 2009; Sengupta, Dahl, and Gorn 2002), motivation to lie (e.g., social comparison) 
(Argo, White, and Dahl 2006; Goldsmith, Roux, and Ma 2018; Mazar and Zhong 2010), 
consequences of lying (Anthony and Cowley 2012; Cowley and Anthony 2018), and moral 
judgment of lies (Argo and Shiv 2012). They also have investigated specific dishonest 
consumer behaviors, such as purchases of counterfeit products (Wang, Stoner, and John 
2018; Wilcox, Kim, and Sen 2009), lying in consumer surveys (De Jong, Fox, and 
Steenkamp 2015), the influence of social bonds on lying (Nikolova, Lamberton, and 
Coleman 2018), and lying to harmful brands (Rotman, Khamitov, and Connors 2018).  
Similarly, a great deal of research has been devoted to understanding the role of 
language in consumer behavior (Carnevale, Luna, and Lerman 2017). Language (L2 vs. 
L1) influences advertising effectiveness (Krishna and Ahluwalia 2008; Luna and Peracchio 
2001, 2005; Puntoni, de Langhe, and van Osselaer 2009) and brand evaluations (Leclerc, 
Schmitt, and Dube 1994; Shrum et al. 2012; Zhang and Schmitt 2004); L2 use can polarize 
scale ratings (de Langhe et al. 2011) and reduce impulsive decision making (Klesse, 
Levav, and Goukens 2015). To my knowledge, no previous consumer research has 
examined how language relates to lying behaviors, though researchers in other fields have.  
Effect of language on lying 
Recent research in psychology and economics suggests that L2 decreases lying 




Meyer et al. (2018) conducted a study in which participants rolled a die and reported the 
outcome. Participants were incentivized to lie, because they could earn higher rewards if 
they reported higher outcomes (e.g., rolling a 1 earned participants $1, and rolling a 4 
earned $4). Lying was private and anonymous. If participants told the truth, the 
distribution of reported outcomes should have been roughly even across various payoffs. If 
participants lied, the distribution of reported outcomes should have been skewed toward 
higher payoffs. In several experiments, lying occurred to a lesser extent in L2 contexts than 
L1 contexts. The authors concluded that though people are tempted to lie for self-benefit, 
L2 weakens this temptation. A separate group of researchers similarly found that L2 
decreased lying compared with L1 (Alempaki et al. 2017). These studies provide evidence 
that lying varies by language. However, does L2 always decrease lying, and if not, when 
does L2 increase rather than decrease lying? 
I suggest that L2 does not necessarily suppress lying, and whether it increases or 
decreases lying depends on people’s intuitive L1 responses (i.e., whether lying or telling 
the truth is their most intuitive behavior). Intuitions are the thoughts that automatically 
spring to people’s minds; they are powerful drivers of decision making (Epley and 
Gilovich 2006; Risen 2016), particularly moral decision making (Haidt and Joseph 2004). 
They serve as the default that people cling to unless they are prompted to deviate (Epstein 
1994; Thompson 2012). Literature is divided on whether lying or telling the truth tends to 
be people’s intuitive response.  
On the one hand, people intuitively may avoid lying, because it is a stressful 
experience (Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeǧi-Dinn 2009; Dienstbier and Munter 1971). 
Neural evidence points in this direction: Greene and Paxton (2009) asked participants to 
privately predict the results of randomly flipped coins (head or tail) and found that control-
related areas in the prefrontal cortex are more active when people lie for self-benefit, 
suggesting that being honest is the intuitive response. On the other hand, lying can be 
tempting, and people may intuitively pursue it. External stimulation of the brain region 
involved in behavioral control enhanced honesty in the aforementioned die-rolling task 
(Maréchal et al. 2017). Time pressure, which encourage fast intuitive responses, increase 




control resources are lie more for monetary gains (Kochaki and Smith 2013; Mead, 
Baumeister, and Gino 2009), and resisting the temptation to lie depletes self-control 
resources (Gino et al. 2011). These mixed findings suggest that people can be both 
intuitively honest and intuitively dishonest, depending on the situation.  
If language moderates the extent to which people’s behavior follows intuitive 
responses, I expect L1 and L2 to lead to different behaviors depending on which 
response—lying or telling the truth—is intuitive. One of the most prominent findings in 
literature on the role of language in decision making is that L2 decreases intuitive biases in 
decision making, such as loss aversion (Costa et al. 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, and An 
2012) and the hot hand fallacy (Gao et al. 2015). Accordingly, I predict that L2 results in 
decreased dishonesty when a person’s intuitive L1 response is to lie but increased 
dishonesty if the intuitive L1 response is to tell the truth. Formally, I refer to this prediction 
as the reduced-intuition effect: 
H1a: L2 increases lying when telling the truth is the intuitive response. 
H1b: L2 decreases lying when lying is the intuitive response. 
Understanding the reduced-intuition effect 
If the effect of language on lying is connected to intuitive responses, the reduced-
intuition effect should depend on the strength of people’s intuitions. When people lack 
intuitive preferences for lying or telling the truth, language should have little impact on the 
occurrence of lying. However, as their intuition becomes stronger, there should be more 
space for language to exert influence, and the effect of language should become larger. 
Thus, an important boundary condition for the effects in H1a and H1b should be the 
strength of intuitive responses. Formally, I predict that the reduced-intuition effect is 
subject to a strength-of-intuition constraint:  
H2: The weaker the intuition, the smaller the reduced-intuition effect. 
I further propose that an important causal mechanism that connects language to lying 
behavior is the greater sense of uncertainty that tends to accompany L2. Most bilinguals 
are not balanced bilinguals; in their daily lives, they are exposed predominantly to L1 




much experience with L2 as with L1, so L2 likely makes them feel more uncertain about 
their environments and the appropriateness of their behaviors. For example, L2 contexts 
lower people’s confidence in their moral judgments (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, and Surian 
2015).  
The claim that L2 tends to generate feelings of uncertainty is unlikely to surprise any 
introspective bilingual. This notion is exemplified by Yiyun Li, a native Chinese novelist 
writing in English, her second language: “If you are a native speaker, things are automatic. 
For me, every time I say or write something (in English), I have to go back and ask, ‘Is this 
what I want to say?’” (Grimes 2018). Many writers have elected to compose in their 
second languages to challenge feelings of certainty. Samuel Beckett’s decision to write in 
French (in which he wrote Waiting for Godot) is often described as an attempt to tame 
intuitive tendencies: “What seems to attract him about French is the very fact that it is less 
second nature to him than is English, that his relationship to it is different and makes him 
more able to manipulate it consciously” (Pattie 2000, 132). American author Jhumpa 
Lahiri describes her decision to write in Italian as a deliberate quest for uncertainty: “I 
trade certainty for uncertainty” (Lahiri 2015).  
I argue that this sense of uncertainty in L2 contexts also is common outside the 
literary world; it penetrates the process of ethical decision making. By drawing on research 
on the impact of meta-cognitive feelings on choices and behavior (Haddock et al. 1999; 
Novemsky et al. 2007; Schwarz 2012), I suggest that feelings of uncertainty prompt people 
to rely less on their intuitions. People are less confident about their intuitive choices when 
they experience greater uncertainty, even when the uncertainty is incidental to the decision 
(Simmons and Nelson 2006). If L2 triggers feelings of uncertainty, it should move people 
away from their intuitive preferences for lying or telling the truth: 
H3: L2 triggers more feelings of uncertainty than L1. 
H4: The greater uncertainty associated with L2 mediates the reduced-intuition effect. 
A different explanation for the reduced-intuition effect is that L2 weakens the 
affective appeal of intuitive responses; people have weaker emotional experiences when 




L2 attenuates people’s feelings about their own behaviors, in that they are not reading 
descriptions of their behaviors (e.g., “lying,” “cheating”). Therefore, I examine the post-
lying feelings associated with L1 and L2. I expand the discussion of alternative theories in 
the General Discussion.  
The studies reported here aim to answer three questions: (1) Do L2 contexts always 
decrease lying, as prior research suggests? (2) If not, when does language choice increase 
or decrease lying? (3) Why does the effect of language occur? I conducted nine studies to 
answer these questions. Studies 1a–1c answer the first question, in car insurance and flight 
delay contexts; studies 2a–2c (advertising contexts) and study 3 (flight delay) examine the 
second question and test the reduced-intuition effect (hypotheses 1a and 1b). Study 4 
addresses the final question in a lottery context and tests the proposed mechanism 
(hypotheses 3 and 4), as well as excluding some alternative explanations. Finally, study 5 
involves a meta-regression across studies to test the strength-of-intuition constraint (H2).  
In all procedures, participants chose between true and false statements. Following 
prior research (Simmons and Nelson 2006; Simmons et al. 2011), I identified the intuitive 
response (to lie or not lie) by comparing the proportion of liars (studies 1a, 1b, 3, and 4) 
and the likelihood of lying (studies 2a, 2b, and 2c) against chance, assuming that the level 
of chance represents indifference to lying or telling the truth. Moreover, to avoid self-
selection biases, I did not mention language as a study component when recruiting 
participants. To ensure that the data reflect lying rather than random noise, I excluded data 
points according to two considerations. First, in studies 1a, 1b, and 3, in which participants 
choose among multiple options, I exclude those who select non-truthful options that do not 
offer any benefits. Second, in studies 2a, 2b, 2c, and 4, in which participants choose 
between two options—lying or telling the truth—I could not tell whether participants 
understood the study based on their choices, so I exclude those who report that their L2 
proficiency is below a minimum requirement (see studies 2a–2c). (Note that self-reported 
L2 proficiency has no relationship to lying across studies, ps > .10.) Participants should 
have no reason to lie on the English proficiency question, which always appears before the 
language manipulation and is embedded among other L1 filler questions. In most of the 




respectively. For generalizability, I also extend the results to other languages (French as L1 
and Korean as L2).  
Does L2 Always Decrease Lying? 
 Studies 1a–1c tested the language effect on lying behavior in two consumer-
relevant scenarios: purchase of car insurance and flight delay compensation. These 
scenarios involved monetary incentives for people to lie with little risk of being caught and 
punished. All three studies used English as L2 and Chinese as L1. According to Bereby-
Meyer et al. (2018), foreign language decreases lying; however, I consistently find the 
opposite result. 
Study 1a: Car insurance 
Study 1a was a pre-registered test of the effect of language on lying (registered at 
https://goo.gl/ADbXm4). Inspired by Shu et al. (2012) (experiment 3), I designed a car 
insurance scenario. I asked participants to imagine that they were purchasing car insurance, 
filling out the policy form, and reporting the current odometer reading. Because higher 
odometer readings mean more driving, higher risk of accidents, and more expensive 
insurance, there is an incentive for consumers to underreport odometer readings.  
Participants and study design. To reach native Chinese speakers in an anonymous 
environment, I distributed the study online to users of one of the largest Internet companies 
in China, Baidu.com. I predetermined the recruitment of 400 participants from the website 
(171 males, Mage = 30, SD = 7.7) in the hope of having at least 100 participants per cell 
after data exclusions. Most participants were employed in various industries; unemployed 
(including students) people constituted 12% of the sample. 
Procedure. In the first part, participants answered demographic questions and then 
read a brief introduction to the car insurance scenario. This part was always written in 
Chinese (L1). In the second part, I randomly assigned participants to enter the English (L2) 
or Chinese (L1) scenarios. In their designated scenarios, they viewed the policy form (see 
Appendix); I told them that the actual odometer reading on their car was 4,501 kilometers. 




readings. Participants then chose an odometer reading to report from a pricing list. I 
arranged the pricing such that the insurance premium would increase by ¥3,000 (Chinese 
yuan) when the odometer readings exceeded 3,200 kilometers but not if they were lower 
than this level. There were two options that did not exceed 3,200 kilometers (see Table A1 
in Appendix). If people are indifferent to lying or telling the truth, there should be an equal 
chance for them to select one of the three options (truth and the two lying options), such 
that the chance level of lying is approximately 67%. I measured whether participants chose 
to tell the truth or lie to evade the additional payment and compared the proportion of liars 
against the chance level. 
Results. I excluded participants who failed to understand the scenario (n = 147; see 
preregistration form). These participants chose the untrue options that did not bring 
monetary benefits (e.g., choosing 3,400–3,600 kilometers, which was not the truth but did 
not reduce the payment). Counter to Bereby-Meyer et al.’s (2018) finding, the proportion 
of liars was higher in the L2 condition (49 of 130, 38%) than in the L1 condition (25 of 
123, 20%) (χ2 (1, N = 253) = 8.39, p = .003). As shown in figure 1, lying in both the L1 
and L2 conditions fell below the chance level (ps < .001).  
Study 1b: Replication of study 1a 
Study 1b was a replication of study 1a with slightly different stimuli. The goal was to 
test the robustness of the findings in study 1a. 
Participants and study design. This Study had 333 participants (146 males; age not 
recorded; 11% unemployed, including students). It was a 2 (L2 vs. L1) × 2 (number of 
lying options: 6 vs. 1) between-participants design. I included the second factor to vary the 
chance level of lying. If there are six lying options, in addition to the truthful statement, the 
chance level of lying is approximately 86%. In contrast, when there is only one lying 
option, the chance level drops to 50%. By varying the chance level of lying, I also varied 
the strictness of data exclusion (i.e., more data exclusions and lower chance level with 
fewer lying options), allowing us to assess the robustness of the language effect to the 
strictness of data exclusion.  
Procedure. I arranged the pricing such that the insurance premium increased by 




same pricing but differing numbers of lying options. One list had six options that did not 
exceed 3,000 kilometers (i.e., chance level lying = 86%), whereas the other had only one 
option that did not exceed 3,000 kilometers (chance level lying = 50%). I randomly 
assigned participants to one of the two lists and directed them to make their choices. For 
details, see Table A1 in Appendix. 
Results. Following study 1a, I excluded participants who failed to understand the 
scenario (n = 29 when there were six lying options, n = 73 when there was one lying 
option). As figure 1 shows, the proportion of liars always fell below the chance level (p < 
.001). Logistic regressions showed that the number of lying options did not moderate the 
language effect (E = 0.30, SE = 0.71, z = 0.43, p = .671). Therefore, I collapsed the 
observations across pricing lists to focus on the role of language. Consistent with study 1a, 
the proportion of liars was higher in the L2 condition (41%) than in the L1 condition 
(17%) (χ2 (1, N = 201) = 12.19, p < .001). 
Study 1c: Flight delay  
 Study 1c generalizes the findings of studies 1a and 1b to a flight delay context. 
Consumers frequently receive compensation for delays, which increases with longer 
delays. This situation creates an incentive for consumers to over-report delays.  
 Participants and study design. This study had 372 participants (168 males; age 
not recorded; 13% unemployed, including students). It was a 2 (L2 vs. L1) × 2 (number of 
lying options: 8 vs. 3) between-participants design. As in study 1b, the second factor 
varied the chance level of lying.  
Procedure. The procedure followed studies 1a and 1b. The only difference was the 
scenario; in this study, participants viewed a complaint form similar to that in figure 1. 
They were told (in L1 or L2) that their flight had a 30-minute delay. Participants then 
chose the delay to report from a list of compensation options. The compensation was ¥95 if 
they reported a delay longer than 180 minutes and ¥50 otherwise. Similar to study 1a, I 
created two lists with the same structure of compensation options but different numbers of 
lying options (see Appendix). One list had eight options longer than 180 minutes (chance 




participant randomly viewed one of the two lists and made a choice. I measured whether 
participants chose to tell the truth or lie for additional compensation.  
Results. As in studies 1a and 1b, I excluded participants who failed to understand the 
scenario (no exclusions for eight lying options, n = 27 when there were three lying 
options). Consistent with study 1b, the number of lying options did not moderate the 
language effect (p = .691). Crucially, lying was again more likely in the L2 condition 
(47%) than in the L1 condition (16%) (χ2 (1, N = 345) = 35.22, p < .001).  
Discussion 
 Studies 1a–1c test the effect of language on lying behavior in two consumer-
relevant contexts. Counter to Bereby-Meyer et al.’s (2018) finding that L2 contexts 
decrease lying, they show that L2 makes lying more likely. This contradiction motivated 
us to investigate when L2 decreases lying behavior and when it does the opposite.  
When Does L2 Increase (vs. Decrease) Lying? 
According to the reduced-intuition effect, L2 increases lying when people intuitively 
prefer not to lie (H1a) and decreases it when the intuition is to lie (H1b). I also predicted 
that these language effects would depend on the strength of intuition (H2). To test these 
predictions, I had to identify a factor that systematically affects the intuitive preference 
between lying and telling the truth. In the L1 condition, the intuitive response could vary 
with the gap between truth and lies. Although most people lie when a small deviation from 
the truth brings self-benefits (e.g., claiming to have successfully solved three problems in a 
task, after actually solving two), most people avoid lies that are far from the truth (e.g., 
claiming to have successfully solved three problems after solving none). In a die-rolling 
task, lying decreases as the truth–lie gap increases (Hilbig and Hessler 2013). The rationale 
for this effect is that small gaps are easy to justify (e.g., “I almost made it”) and rationalize 
as non-violations of the norm to be honest, but larger gaps warn people of the risk of being 
blatant liars and threatening their self-images (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008). I exploited 
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In studies 2a and 2c, I employed a spot-the-difference task to test the theory. The task 
adopted a 3 (minor vs. moderate vs. major truth-lie gap) × 2 (L2 vs. L1) mixed design, 
with the truth–lie gap manipulated within participant and language manipulated between 
participants. The task required participants to find three differences between two 
advertising images, ostensibly as a test of visual perception of advertisements. Participants 
observed a pair of images for 5 seconds and then indicated whether they found three 
differences by selecting “yes” or “no” (no time limit to answer). Participants repeated this 
task in 12 trials with different image pairs; they were promised a fixed monetary reward 
each time they managed to find three differences. Unbeknownst to participants, only 3 of 
the 12 trials had three differences; the rest had 0–2 differences. Table 1 summarizes the 
types of trials and their interpretation. Participants must have been lying if they claimed to 
have found three differences in the zero-to-two difference trials. Moreover, the truth–lie 
gap increased from minor to major as the number of actual differences decreased from two 
to zero.  
 
Table 1: Trials in the spot-the-difference task and the interpretation of responses. 
 
“Did you find all 
three differences?” 
3-difference 
trials (n = 3) 
2-difference 
trials (n = 3) 
1-difference 
trials (n = 3) 
0-difference 












(no reward) Honest 
a Ambiguous interpretation if the error rate is non-negligible. 
 
Studies 2a-2c: pretest 
I pretested the validity of my paradigm. If the manipulation of truth–lie gaps is valid, 
I should observe that (1) participants could accurately spot the real number of differences 
when there is no incentive to lie and (2) their performance is independent of language.  
Participants. I posted the link to the pretest on Witmart, a Chinese crowdsourcing 
platform similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk. Before entering the pretest, participants had 




English (L2) by selecting an option from the following: “Elementary: I can read a few 
words and phrases,” “Intermediate: I can read simple paragraphs like emails,” “Upper-
intermediate: I can read long essays,” or “Advanced: I can read original works.” To ensure 
that participants understood L2 instructions, I screened out those who selected the 
elementary level; 67 Witmart workers (34 males; Mage = 26 years, SD = 5.6) passed the 
screening and participated in the pretest.  
Procedure. I randomly assigned participants to complete the pretest in either their L1 
or L2. I asked them to indicate how many differences they found between images, as 
accurately as possible. After reading the instructions, they went through two practice trials 
with three differences. They then completed the 12-trial task. In each trial, participants 
observed two images side by side for 5 seconds and then selected the number of 
differences they found (0–3). There was no incentive for them to lie. I measured 
participants’ accuracy by calculating the percentage of trials in which they found the right 
number of differences.  
Results. Table 2 summarizes participants’ performance. As expected, accuracy was 
significantly above the chance level (25% if they randomly select a number from 0–3 
differences) across types of trials (ps < .001). That is, participants could accurately tell the 
number of differences when there was no incentive to lie. In addition, performance did not 
differ by language condition (p = .577). These results testified to the validity of my 
paradigm. Notably, the error rates in the three-difference trials were non-negligible, 
making it difficult to tell whether participants would lie in these trials when incentivized 
(see footnote to Table 1). For this reason, I did not analyze three-difference trials in the 
main studies.  
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Study 2a: English versus Chinese 
Participants and procedure. An additional 153 Witmart workers (who passed the 
screening of English proficiency, 86 males, Mage = 26 years, SD = 4.5) participated in 
study 2a. About 25% were unemployed (including students). The majority (54%) indicated 
an “intermediate” level of English reading proficiency. The procedure was the same as in 
the pretest except that participants were incentivized to lie. Every time participants claimed 
to have found three differences, I rewarded them with ¥0.65 (USD $0.10). At the end of 
the study, I debriefed participants about the study purpose using a funneled procedure.  
Results. Given the nested structure of the data, I conducted a multilevel analysis with 
the following model, estimated with the lme4 package in R: 
Level 1: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗. 
Level 2: 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑔𝑎𝑝 + 𝜖𝑖. 
Level 3: 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜖 
Subscript i refers to the individual, and j refers to the type of trial within individuals; 
Es represent random errors. The outcome variable “response” is binary with a logit link 
(successful find/lying = 1, unsuccessful find/honest = 0). The truth–lie gap is the trial-level 
predictor (continuous), and language condition is the individual-level predictor (binary). 
Coefficients were estimated log odds: Lying was more likely than honesty (i.e., exceeded 
the 50% chance level) when coefficients were above 0, and vice versa. 
I find a significant interaction between the truth–lie gap and language (z = -5.02, p < 
.001). The negative sign indicates that the tendencies in the L1 condition were attenuated 
in the L2 condition. In the L1 condition, minor lying was significantly higher than the 
chance level (E = 2.20, SE = 0.33, z = 6.71, p < .001). In contrast, major lying was 
significantly lower than the chance level (E = -1.02, SE = 0.30, z = -3.38, p = .001). The 
L2 condition significantly reduced these tendencies, decreasing minor lying (z = -4.30, p < 
.001) and increasing major lying (z = 3.59, p < .001). Moderate lying fell between minor 
and major lying and was not influenced by language (z = -0.07, p = .948). Table 3 






Table 3: Estimated likelihoods of lying across sizes of lies and languages. 
 
Study Language condition Minor lying Moderate lying Major lying 
Study 2a 
 
L1 82% a 57% 35% a 
L2 59% a 57% 56% a 
Study 2b 
 
L1 47% 25% b 12% a 
L2 39% 34% b 30% a 
Study 2c 
 
L1 59% b 49% 41% b 
L2 48% b 53% 55% b 
a Significant language effect at p < .001. b Language effect at p < .1. 
 
Study 2b: English versus French 
Participants and procedure. To generalize the findings to a different L1, I conducted 
study 2b with native French speakers. I recruited 70 participants (40 males, Mage = 31 
years, SD = 7.7; all passed English-proficiency screening) via social networks. They were 
located in France and working in various industries (13% were students). The majority of 
participants (50%) reported an “advanced” level of English proficiency. The procedure 
followed study 2a. Participants received €0.20 (USD $0.23) each time they claimed to 
have found three differences. 
Results. I conducted the same analysis as in study 2a and obtained a significant 
interaction in the same direction (z = -3.37, p < .001). In the L1 condition, major lying was 
significantly below chance (E = -2.94, SE = 0.48, z = -6.14, p < .001); the L2 condition 
reduced this tendency, increasing major lying (z = 3.47, p < .001). In contrast with study 
2a, I did not find that the rate of minor lying significantly differed from the chance level (E 
= -0.21, SE = 0.47, z = -0.44, p = .657). Unsurprisingly, given the theorizing, the L2 
condition had little influence on minor lying (z = -1.26, p = .209). Moderate lying fell 
between minor and major lying and was less likely in the L2 condition than in the L1 
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Study 2c: Korean versus Chinese 
Participants and procedure. To generalize the findings to a different L2, I conducted 
study 2c with adult Chinese learners of Korean (using a panel from the survey company 
wjx.cn). I used the same screening question for Korean proficiency as in studies 2a and 2b. 
The majority (81%) indicated an “intermediate” level of proficiency. There were 117 
participants (30 males; Mage = 30 years, SD = 4.3; 7% were students). The procedure 
followed studies 2a and 2b, with a reward of ¥1.5 (USD $0.22) for each claim of 
successful find. 
Results. Using the same model, I again obtained a significant interaction between the 
truth–lie gap and language (z = -3.95, p < .001). In the L1 condition, minor lying was 
significantly above chance (E = 0.71, SE = 0.30, z = 2.34, p = .019). Major lying fell below 
the chance level, though the difference was marginal (E = -0.66, SE = 0.41, z = -1.61, p = 
.108); the L2 condition decreased minor lying (z = -1.82, p = .069) and increased major 
lying (z = 1.76, p = .079). Moderate lying fell between minor and major lying and was not 
influenced by language (z = 0.27, p = .785). 
Discussion of studies 2a–2c 
Studies 2a–2c demonstrate the reduced-intuition effect: When lying is intuitive (i.e., 
minor deviation from the truth is required to obtain the monetary reward), L2 decreases 
lying (H1b); when honesty prevails (i.e., major deviation from the truth is required to 
obtain the monetary reward), L2 increases lying (H1a). Language does not (or only 
weakly, as in study 2c) affect lying behavior when lying does not differ (or marginally 
differs) from the chance level (H2). This pattern is robust across language pairs. These 
crossover effects also suggest that L2 does not alter the perceived value of material 
benefits. If L2 increased lying in studies 1a–1c by making rewards look more appealing, I 
should have observed that L2 always increased lying relative to L1. To test the 
generalizability of the findings, in the next study (study 3) I add a manipulation of the 
truth–lie gap to the flight-delay scenario used in study 1c and implement the manipulation 





Study 3: Revised flight-delay scenario  
Participants and design. I used the flight-delay scenario from study 1c and randomly 
assigned 613 participants from Baidu (294 males, Mage = 30 years, SD = 7.8; 12% were 
students or unemployed) to read the scenario in L1 (Chinese) or L2 (English). The study 
was a 2 (L2 vs. L1) × 2 (minor vs. major truth–lie gap) between-participants design. In the 
scenario, participants could receive ¥50 as compensation when reporting the flight delay 
truthfully (“≤ 30 minutes”) but ¥95 when overreporting its length. In the minor truth–lie 
gap condition, to receive ¥95, participants needed to select “31–60 minutes,” which was 
the category closest to the truth. In the major condition, participants instead needed to 
select the “> 300 minutes” category, which was furthest from the truth.  
Results and discussion. Similar to studies 1a to 1c, I excluded participants who failed 
to understand the scenario, so the final data set contained 363 participants. A logistic 
regression (1 = lying, 0 = honest) showed a significant interaction between language (L2 
vs. L1) and the truth–lie gap (minor vs. major) on the likelihood of lying (z = -2.46, p = 
.014). In the major truth–lie-gap condition, participants avoided lying in the L1 condition 
(proportion of liars = 12%, significantly below the 50% chance level, p < .001). However, 
this tendency toward honesty decreased in the L2 condition (proportion of liars = 25%, z = 
1.98, p = .048). The lying rate in the minor truth–lie- gap condition did not significantly 
differ from the chance level in the L1 condition (49%, p = .860) and thus, unsurprisingly, 
was not affected by the L2 condition (39%, z = -1.49, p = .136). These results are 
consistent with the findings of studies 2a–2c. Figure 3 plots the results. 
Why Does the Reduced-Intuition Effect Occur? 
I also tested the proposed mechanism, by which L2 increases feelings of uncertainty 
(H3), which mediates the reduced intuition effect (H4). I also tested alternative 
explanations. For example, L2 may reduce emotional reactions to lying, such that lying 
feels positive (negative) in L1 contexts, but L2 contexts reduce the intensity of such 
feelings and result in less intuitive responses. In a final meta-analysis of all the 





Figure 3: Results of study 3. 
 
 
Notes: The y-axis is the proportion of liars (0–100%), and the x-axis the truth–lie-gap. The 
horizontal dashed line denotes the chance level of lying (50%). 
 
Study 4: The role of uncertainty 
Participants and study design. I recruited 500 participants over 25 years of age (i.e., 
targeted those with a minimum age of 26 years) from Baidu for a study about online 
shopping. In the online shopping survey (in L1), I embedded the English proficiency-
screening question from studies 2a–2c. Those who passed the screening continued to the 
question that allowed us to detect lying. In the end, 302 participants (164 men, Mage = 31 
years, SD = 5.8) completed the focal measures. Most participants (68%) reported an 
“intermediate” level of proficiency. The study was a 2 (L2 vs. L1) × 2 (lottery value: low 
vs. high) between-participants design. I included the second factor for exploratory 
purposes, because prior research shows that larger incentives increase lying (Kajackaite 
and Gneezy 2017). 
Procedure. Participants completed a series of questions in either L1 or L2. The first 
two questions referred to gender and monthly income. The critical question was the third 
one, which incentivized participants to lie. Specifically, I told participants that in addition 
to their participation fee, they could enter a lottery for a gift card from Amazon.com if they 
were undergraduate students. Participants randomly viewed the low-value (¥5, about USD 




they were currently undergraduate students by selecting “yes” or “no.” The latest 
government census (NBS 2012) shows that less than 1% of Chinese people older than 25 
years are still undergraduates. Therefore, if the participants, who were all over 25 years, 
claimed to be undergraduates, they likely were lying (motivated by the prospect of 
receiving a gift card). (Note that I recruited participants according to birthday information 
provided by Baidu; I did not ask participants their age.)  
Following the question about undergraduate status, I asked participants to indicate 
whether the gift card was appealing to them, whether they felt bad, and whether they felt 
good right now (1 = definitely not, 7 = definitely yes). Finally, I measured participants’ 
perceived uncertainty. Based on Geipel et al.’s (2015) measurement of confidence in moral 
judgments, I created two items to measure generic feelings of uncertainty: “Are you 
confident about your responses above?” and “Are you sure about your responses above?” 
(1 = definitely not, 7 = definitely yes, α = .81); I computed an uncertainty score by 
averaging participants’ reverse-coded responses. 
Results: Proportion of liars. I submitted language condition (L2 vs. L1) and reward 
size (high vs. low) to a logistic regression to predict the likelihood of lying. Reward size 
did not moderate the effect of language (E = 0.40, SE = 0.57, z = 0.48, p = .488). Chi-
square analyses showed that the proportion of liars was slightly higher when the value of 
the gift card was high (36%) versus low (26%) (χ2 (1, N = 302) = 3.79, p = .052). 
Participants avoided lying in the L1 condition (16% were liars, significantly below the 
50% chance level, p < .001), but the percentage of liars increased in the L2 condition (43% 
were liars), (χ2 (1, N = 302) = 24.81, p < .001), confirming the reduced-intuition effect.  
Results: Attractiveness of the gift card. I submitted language and reward size to a two-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the perceived attractiveness of the gift card. 
Unsurprisingly, the high-value gift card was rated more attractive (M = 4.78) than the low-
value gift card (M = 4.42; F(1, 298) = 4.07, p = .045, partial 𝜼𝟐 = .01). Moreover, the L2 
condition decreased the perceived attractiveness of the gift card (M = 4.87) relative to L1 
(M = 4.33; F(1, 298) = 9.38, p = .002, partial 𝜼𝟐 = .03). According to a marginal 
interaction between language and reward size, the attractiveness gap between high- and 




L1 condition (Mhigh = 5.21, Mlow = 4.52; F(1, 298) = 3.79, p = .053, partial 𝜼𝟐 = .01). 
Attractiveness of the gift card did not predict the likelihood of lying (E = -0.04, SE = 0.08, 
z = 0.26, p = .611). This finding negates the possibility that language affects lying by 
altering the perceived value of gains.  
Results: Liars’ feelings. I next examined how people felt after lying. Because 
language and lying were related, I conducted subgroup analyses. In the L1 condition, liars 
did not feel more positive (M = 4.86) than non-liars (M = 4.68; t(134) = 0.52, p = .600). 
However, liars felt more negative (M = 3.64) than non-liars (M = 2.93; t(134) = 1.95, p = 
.053). The same pattern emerged in the L2 condition: Liars did not feel more positive (M = 
4.82) than non-liars (M = 5.05; t(164) = 1.04, p = .302) but felt more negative (M = 3.93) 
than non-liars (M = 3.26; t(164) = 2.51, p = .013). Overall, language had no effect on liars’ 
or non-liars’ feelings (p > .15), except that non-liars in the L2 condition felt slightly more 
positive than those in the L1 condition (t(207) = 1.76, p = .079).  
Results: Perceived uncertainty. Finally, I assessed the role of uncertainty. The L2 
condition (M = 2.79) increased feelings of uncertainty relative to the L1 condition (M = 
2.24; t(300) = 3.82, p < .001). Moreover, uncertainty positively predicted the likelihood of 
lying (E= 0.53, SE = 0.11, z = 25.77, p < .001). I next tested a mediation model with 5,000 
bootstrapped samples, using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS Macro in SPSS (model 4). Figure 
4 illustrates the results. In support of H4, the indirect path through uncertainty is 
significant (E = 0.26, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [0.12, 0.47]). Accounting for the role of 
uncertainty, the effect of language on lying shrinks in magnitude (from E = 1.35, SE = 
0.28, z = 4.82 to z = 4.00) but remains significant (path c in figure 5, p < .001). 
Discussion. Study 4 provides evidence for the increased-uncertainty account (H3 and 
H4). It also shows that emotional responses toward lying and perceived attractiveness of 









Figure 4: Mediation model in study 4. 
 
 
Notes: Standardized coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients for 
paths b and c are log odds ratios. ***p < .001. 
 
Study 5: The intuitive-strength constraint 
The reduced-intuition effect implies that the language effect should become stronger 
as the strength of intuitive responses increases (H2, strength-of-intuition constraint). 
Although studies 2a–3 offered suggestive evidence, I also seek to assess H2 using meta-
regression. I tested the relationship between the strength of intuition in the L1 condition 
and the magnitude of the reduced intuition effect across eight studies. I operationalized 
strength of intuition in terms of the deviation from the chance level of lying, as the 
absolute value of the standardized distance between the L1 response and the chance level 
of lying: 
Intuitive strength = |ProbL1−ChanceChance | 
where ProbL1 is the proportion of liars (studies 1a, 1b, 3, and 4) or the estimated mean 
likelihood of lying (studies 2a–2c) in the L1 condition, and Chance refers to the chance 
level of lying, which varies across conditions and studies. According to this formula, 
intuitive strength ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 equal to the chance level.  
I operationalized the magnitude of the language effect as the absolute value of 
Cohen’s d, calculated with the formula by Borenstein et al. (2009): 








Table 4: Data points used for meta-regression. 
 











1a - 253 67 20 38 0.86 
1b 6 lying options 117 86 22 48 1.23 
1b 1 lying options 84 50 13 27 0.93 
1c 8 lying options 183 89 22 61 1.69 
1c 3 lying options 162 75 10 31 1.47 
2a Minor truth–lie gap 153 50 82 59 -1.67 
2a Moderate truth–lie gap 153 50 57 57 -0.14 
2a Major truth–lie gap 153 50 35 56 1.38 
2b Minor truth–lie gap 70 50 47 39 -0.38 
2b Moderate truth–lie gap 70 50 25 34 0.44 
2b Major truth–lie gap 70 50 11 30 1.27 
2c Minor truth–lie gap 119 50 59 48 -0.77 
2c Moderate truth–lie gap 119 50 49 53 0.12 
2c Major truth–lie gap 119 50 41 55 1.02 
3 Minor truth–lie gap 232 50 49 39 -0.40 
3 Major truth–lie gap 131 50 12 25 0.93 
4 Low-value gift card 152 50 16 39 1.54 
4 High-value gift card 150 150 21 46 1.15 
 
The calculations use the data points in Table 4. With the calculated results, I fitted a 
random-effects model, regressing the magnitude of the language effect on the strength of 
intuition measure, with adjustment to standard errors (Suurmond, van Rhee, and Hak 
2017). In support of H2, the strength of intuition was a strong predictor of the magnitude 
of the language effect (E = 0.71, SE = 0.17, z = 4.11, p < .001). The intercept was not 
significant (E = 0.16, SE = 0.10, z = 1.63, p = .104), suggesting that language has little 









Figure 5: Relationship of the intuitive strength of response in L1 (x-axis, 0–1) and the 
magnitude of the language effect (y-axis). 
 
Notes: Dots are data points from studies 1a–4, and dot size represents relative weight. Line 
is the fitted meta-regression line. 
General Discussion 
This chapter explores three questions about the effect of language on lying. First, does 
language always decrease lying, as shown by Bereby-Meyer et al. (2018) and by Alempaki 
et al. (2017)? I answer in the negative. In car insurance and flight delay contexts, I find that 
L2 increases the proportion of liars relative to L1, in which most people choose to be 
honest (H1a). Second, when does L2 increase versus decrease the occurrence of lying? The 
answer depends on intuitive responses in the L1 context. Using a novel spot-the-difference 
task in the context of print advertising, I find that L2 makes lying more likely when people 
intuitively avoid lying (H1a) and less likely when they intuitively pursue lying (H1b). This 
finding is confirmed by a replication with a flight delay scenario. Third, what explains the 
reduced-intuition effect? The answer is that L2 engenders uncertainty (H3), which in turn 
reduces their intuitive attraction or aversion to lying (H4). I do not find evidence that L2 




lying or telling the truth. In a final meta-regression, I test the role of intuitive responses by 
combining all the data; I find that strength of intuition significantly accounts for the 
variation in the language effect.  
This research complements prior research on lying and bilingualism in three ways. 
First, whereas prior research focuses on whether or not people lie and on how much they 
lie (Mazar et al. 2008), I investigate people’s preferences for lying or telling the truth. By 
differentiating whether lying or telling the truth is intuitive, I am able to resolve 
inconsistencies between the current findings and previous research. Second, the main 
finding (the reduced-intuition effect) adds to prior research showing that L2 reduces 
intuitive biases in decision making (Keysar et al. 2012), hinders the intuitive choice of 
unhealthy food (Klesse et al. 2015), and decreases intuitive aversion to drinking recycled 
water (Geipel, Constantinos, and Klesse 2018). Moreover, the current study offers 
preliminary evidence on what drives the effect of language on lying behavior. To my 
knowledge, this research the first to examine the meta-cognitive feeling elicited by L2. 
Third, the consumer-related studies address the paucity of research on consumer frauds 
and have useful implications for consumption situations, discussed next. I encourage 
continued studies to generalize the results from simplified paradigms (e.g., die-roll, coin-
flip) to real-life situations. 
Alternative theories 
In this research, I propose that L2 reduces intuitive responses by introducing a generic 
sense of uncertainty. In light of these findings, I discuss some alternative theories. 
Cultural priming. Language can activate norms and associations originating from the 
cultural background of the language (Chen and Bond 2010). For example, Lee, Oyserman, 
and Bond (2010) find that English triggers self-enhancement motives among native 
Chinese speakers whose L1 is associated with a more collective culture that de-emphasizes 
individuality. In a context of lying, the effect of language depends on perceived cultural 
norms of honesty: L2 decreases (increases) lying if it is associated with more (less) honest 
cultures compared with L1 cultures. Although this tendency may be true when a 




spot-the-difference task, I observed for the same language pair both an increase and a 
decrease of lying within the same participants (studies 2a and 2c). 
Attenuated emotionality. The “intuitive responses” that I refer to also may describe 
people’s positive emotions. Because L2 tends to decrease emotional intensity to stimuli, it 
may decrease the dominant responses for which people have positive (or non-negative) 
feelings. Corey et al. (2017) find that in hypothetical moral dilemmas, L2 makes people 
less aversive to “killing” someone to save others. In contrast, I do not find that lying 
triggers weaker emotional response in L2 contexts; rather, people who tell the truth in L2 
contexts feel more positive than those in L1 contexts (study 4). Emotional experience per 
se thus is unlikely to explain the effects I observe. Instead, the increased-uncertainty 
account suggests that language changes the weighting of intuition, which could be 
emotional information in moral decisions.  
Enhanced analytical thinking. In contrast to prior findings that foreign language 
reduces decision biases (Gao et al. 2015), I do not find that L2 increases “rational” 
responses. If so, I should have observed that L2 increases lying across the board, given the 
anonymity of lying and its sure gains. This research echoes the recent finding that L2 does 
not enhance utilitarianism when people respond to moral dilemmas (Hayakawa et al. 2017) 
and does not promote analytical reasoning (e.g., reducing the Moses illusion) (Costa et al. 
2014; Geipel et al. 2015). In general, rationality seems to be a byproduct of reduced 
intuition in L2 contexts, manifested only when the alternative to the intuitive choice is 
normatively superior (e.g., binary choice between lotteries) and absent when deliberative 
calculation is required (Vives, Aparici, and Costa 2018).  
To summarize, these findings provide little support for alternative theories about the 
effect of language on lying. A failure to account for the current findings does not mean 
these alternative mechanisms cannot underlie the effect of language in other circumstances 
though; cultural priming does not appear influential in the populations of the current sutdy, 
but it may have a significant role among people who strongly, homogeneously perceive a 
cultural gap with regard to honesty (e.g., undergraduates in elite schools). Similarly, I do 




outcome of lying is more salient (e.g., lying face-to-face versus on a computer). Further 
research can examine these possibilities.  
Practical implications 
Companies are concerned about consumers’ dishonesty; they invest heavily in 
identifying and deterring potential fraud (FRISS 2019; Ma 2018). This research reveals 
that language influences dishonesty, so the algorithms and indicators used to identify liars 
in L1 context may not work as well when people are native speakers of another language. 
Companies thus should consider language contexts in their efforts to prevent fraudulent 
behavior.  
In some cases, language might be used to nudge people toward more desirable 
behavior without coercion (e.g., drinking more recycled water) (Geipel et al. 2018). At 
least for ethical behavior, changing the language context from L1 to L2 does not 
necessarily help and even can backfire. These findings suggest caution with using 
language as a tool to curb lying behavior; instead, the recommendation is to understand the 
intuitive behavior of the targeted population and determine how robust the behavior is, 
before gauging whether language serves the goal of reducing lying behavior.  
Relatedly, this research suggests that interventions that have proved effective in 
reducing lying in L1 contexts may not work as well in L2 contexts. Reminders of moral 
identity may transform people’s intuitions from acquiring resources to being honest, but 
this shift might be weaker or even absent in L2 contexts. This possibility is mirrored in the 
finding that people’s intuitions about dishonesty are malleable, but the malleability is 
much lower in L2 contexts because of the weaker intuitive response in these contexts 
(studies 2a–3). Policy makers and executives should consider the language to be adopted 
for the planned intervention and determine whether it matches the native language of the 
targeted population. 
Limitations 
The use of online panels allowed us to reach diverse samples of participants and 
maximize the privacy of lying. However, it also posed challenges, such as ensuring that 
participants understood the study requirements (especially difficult in bilingual studies). I 




priori data exclusions to the other half (studies 2a, 2b, 2c, and 4). Both criteria have 
limitations. A posteriori data exclusions could result in high attrition rates and potentially 
introduce biases. The variation in chance levels of lying across studies, and across 
conditions in some of the studies, attenuates this concern, because the pattern of results 
persists across levels of leniency of data exclusion (e.g., no data exclusion when eight of 
nine were lying options versus very strict exclusion when one of nine was; studies 1a–1c). 
A priori data exclusions should eliminate the bias, because the randomization is 
implemented after data exclusion. Nevertheless, they are less strict than a posteriori data 
exclusions and introduce more noise, which is less worrisome, given the pretest results 
showing that response quality does not vary across language conditions. Despite these 
efforts and results, I encourage studies that replicate the current findings with alternative 
methods.  
Another challenge is that participants might have dropped out of the study, which 
could have introduced bias to the findings, especially in the L2 conditions, in which people 
might have experienced greater difficulties. To minimize dropouts, I used L1 as much as 
possible, especially at the beginning of the studies, and made the response formats as 
simple as possible (i.e., choice rather than typing sentences). I could not identify the 
dropout rates from Baidu, because Baidu does not record partial responses. However, in 
studies 2a–2c, Qualtrics recorded all data and revealed no partial responses (i.e., no 
dropout after participants started responding). Therefore, it seems reasonable to anticipate 
no impact from dropouts on the findings. Researchers could try to identify who is likely to 
drop out of bilingual studies in general and how they differ from other participants. 
Finally, though I confirm the reduced-intuition effect, I have not delved into the 
question of how intuitions are established in L1 contexts in the first place. Although 
previous research offers some hints (e.g., justifiability), I are not aware of any systematic 
research on this. This question lies outside the scope of the current research, but it would 
be a fruitful path of investigation for continued research on consumer lying behavior.  
To conclude, bilingual consumers can lie in more than one language; this research 
shows that the language they use has a systematic effect on their propensity to lie. I 




reduces people’s intuitive preferences for lying or telling the truth, such that they either 






Figure A1: English (L2) policy forms (upper) used in studies 1a–1b and complaint (lower) 








Table A1: Pricing lists for studies 1a–1c. 
Study 1 Study 1b Study 1c 
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Figure A2: A one-difference trial in the L1 (upper) and the L2 condition (lower) in study 
2a. 
 
Notes: A pair of images was shown for 5 seconds with a countdown timer, followed by the 






















This chapter is based on the original paper published on Journal of Marketing: 
Gai, Phyliss Jia and Anne-Kathrin Klesse (2019), “Making Recommendations More 
Effective through Framings: Impacts of User- versus Item-based Framings on 




Chapter 3 is organized as follows. I first review prior research on recommender 
systems and explanations, define user-based and item-based framings, and develop my 
conceptual framework with concrete predictions. I report six studies, including two online 
field experiments, that test my predictions. This chapter ends with a discussion of the 
theoretical and managerial implications and promising avenues for future research.  
Theoretical Background 
Recommendation systems and explanations to consumers  
Recommendation systems are an automated, data-driven tool that companies 
frequently adopt to fulfill their consumers’ personalization needs (Hinz and Eckert 2010; 
Ricci et al. 2011). Depending on what consumers have viewed, liked, or purchased, these 
systems predict what other products they could be interested in and deliver instant 
suggestions. Research in marketing and information systems highlights such recommender 
systems as important determinants of sales (Bodapati 2008; Fleder and Hosanagar 2009; 
Pathak et al. 2010). Two typical methods inform these recommendations. First, 
collaborative filtering identifies consumers who are similar in their product rating history 
and recommends items that one consumer likes to similar other consumers. The product 
ratings might be explicitly provided by consumers or inferred from their online behavior. 
Second, content-based filtering identifies the product attributes that a consumer likes and 
recommends products with similar attributes (Ansari, Essegaier, and Kohli 2000). Because 
each method has shortcomings, companies often combine them to improve the 
performance of their hybrid recommender systems. Examples include Amazon’s “item-to-
item collaborative filtering” (Linden, Smith, and York 2017), and the New York Times’ 
collaborative topic modeling (Spangher 2015). Extensive research suggests ways to 
improve the prediction accuracy of recommendation algorithms using hybrid frameworks 
(Zhang et al. 2018). 
The computationally complex algorithms pose challenges for explaining 
recommendations to consumers. A clear, concise, accurate explanation is crucial, because 
it promotes consumers’ trust in the recommender systems (Wang and Benbasat 2007) and 
acceptance of recommendations (Cramer et al. 2008; Kramer 2007). To the best of my 




recommendations. In information systems literature, Tintarev and Masthoff (2015) identify 
five recommendation explanation types. Two explanations are particularly relevant to the 
current research: collaborative-based and content-based. As their names imply, 
collaborative-based explanations such as “Consumers who bought this item also bought…” 
rely on recommender systems that adopt collaborative filtering, whereas content-based 
explanations, such as “Recommended because you said you owned…,” involve 
recommender systems that use content-based filtering. The other explanation types either 
overlap with the content-based explanation (e.g., cased-based that specifies the items 
compared by the underlying algorithm) or assume unique inputs (e.g., demographic-based; 
Tintarev and Masthoff 2015).  
Rather than addressing explanation styles yoked to distinct, specific recommendation 
algorithms (Tintarev and Masthoff 2015), I define recommendation framing according to 
the various explanations that might be provided, even with the same recommender system. 
Because most recommender systems take a hybrid approach that combines the input from 
users (i.e., inter-user similarity in preferences) and the input from items (i.e., inter-item 
similarity in attributes), I compare framings that highlight one input over the other, user-
based framing versus item-based framing. Accordingly, the goal of the current research is 
to establish the causal impact of alternating between the user-based and item-based 
framings on click-throughs of recommendations, rather than to provide an exhaustive 
categorization of explanation styles (Tintarev and Masthoff 2015).  
Comparisons of item-based and user-based framing 
As detailed in Figure 1, with user-based framing, the provided explanations draw 
attention to the shared tastes of consumers of a focal item. This framing describes how the 
target user (u) is similar to other users (u’), due to their shared interest in the focal item (i), 
and it indicates that the focal item (i) and recommended item (i’) are related because they 
attract the same users (u’). Item-based framing instead highlights the match between the 
focal and the recommended products (i and i’), either with or without specifying their 
shared properties. For example, “More in Health” suggests that recommended articles will 




item” also emphasizes the relationship between the items but does not cite specific product 
attributes. 
Figure 1: Illustration of the definitions of user-based and item-based framing. 
 
Notes: In user-based framing, consumers u and u’ match in their liking of product i, and 
products i and i’ match in their consumer u’. Item-based framing suggests products i and i’ 
are related. 
 
As these definitions make clear, both user-based and item-based framings suggest 
product matching between items i and i’ as the basis for the recommendation. User-based 
framing matches products by consumers; item-based framing suggests that products are 
matched on their attributes. Notably, user-based framing also suggests taste matching 
(users’ shared taste in the focal product) as the basis for recommendation, such that it 
offers informational value beyond that provided by item-based framing. According to 
advice-taking research, consumers extract information from others’ tastes to predict their 
own satisfaction with unfamiliar products (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, and Milyavsky 2011; 
Morvinski, Amir, and Muller 2017) and tend to adopt others’ preferences if they believe 
those others’ tastes match their own (Hilmert, Kulik, and Christenfeld 2006; Naylor, 
Lamberton, and Norton 2010). Therefore, I reason that user-based framing offers 
additional information (i.e., about others’ tastes) that can reduce consumers’ uncertainty 
about whether they will like or dislike the recommended item. By offering additional 











as a sort of double-guarantee that consumers will enjoy the recommended item and thus 
should be more effective in triggering click-throughs. Formally,  
H1: User-based framing increases recommendation click-throughs relative to item-
based framing.  
This predicted advantage of user-based framing is premised on consumers’ perception 
that the taste matching is successful. Taste matching provides valid information for 
consumers to infer their liking of the recommended item only if they believe others' 
preferences reflect their personal tastes. With automated recommendations, many factors 
could influence the extent to which consumers perceive taste matching as successful and 
potentially reduce or even reverse the framing effect, such that user-based framing actually 
becomes disadvantageous compared with item-based framing. I consider three such factors 
that might provide important boundary conditions to the framing effect. I purposefully 
select a range of factors related to the consumer segment (i.e., more or less consumption 
experience), the products (i.e., more or less attractive focal products), and other users (i.e., 
more or less similar to the recommendation recipient). 
Consumption experience, focal attractiveness, and dissimilarity cues 
User-based framing differs from item-based framing in the implication that the 
recommender system attempts to match users on the basis of their tastes in the focal 
product. Consumers who have accumulated more experience in a consumption domain 
may be less likely to perceive this taste matching as successful, for two reasons. First, 
consumers develop more refined and sophisticated tastes as they acquire more experience 
within a consumption category (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). With more experience, 
consumers are better able to differentiate products and develop a more complex 
understanding of the category (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Second, more experienced 
consumers have accrued more observations of individual differences in tastes and therefore 
likely regard their own taste as idiosyncratic (Packard and Berger 2017). Accordingly, they 
might deem a shared interest in a single or a limited set of products (i.e., focal products) as 
insufficient for taste matching, leaving them reluctant to converge with or rely on other 
users’ preferences. In contrast, inexperienced consumers whose tastes are still coarse 




tastes (Becker 1991), leading to the advantage of user-based over item-based framing. I 
predict: 
H2: The advantage of user-based framing relative to item-based framing decreases for 
consumers with more consumption experience in the focal domain.  
Consumers’ perceptions of taste-matching success also likely depend on the products 
themselves. I propose that taste matching may appear less accurate if the focal product is 
less attractive, because consumers constantly learn about their own preferences through 
their reactions to different products (Ariely and Hoeffler 1999; West, Brown, and Hoch 
2002). More attractive focal products would serve as salient and diagnostic signals of 
personal preferences (Zunick, Teeny, and Fazio 2017), which in turn should promote 
perceived success in taste matching with other users who presumably also like the 
attractive focal product. In contrast, people tend to view less attractive products as less 
indicative of their taste or even a negative signal of preferences, lowering the perceived 
accuracy of taste matching and resulting in a smaller advantage or even a disadvantage of 
user-based framing relative to item-based framing. Specifically:  
H3: The advantage of user-based framing over item-based framing diminishes for 
unattractive focal products.  
Finally, in ambiguous situations, in which the identities of other consumers are not 
revealed, people tend to assume self–other similarity (Naylor, Lamberton, and West 2012). 
However, some companies provide information about the users who are the basis for the 
recommendation, explicitly (e.g., location of other users on booking.com) or implicitly 
(e.g., books of “teen’s choice” on Amazon). When this information points to a 
dissimilarity between users, it may undermine the value of taste matching. As existing 
research shows, dissimilarity on certain dimensions (e.g., gender) activates thoughts of 
self–other dissimilarity in other domains (e.g., product attitudes; Tuk et al. 2019). 
Consumers thus might categorize a recommendation as reflecting “non-self” tastes if it is 
associated with dissimilar others and deem taste-matching efforts unsuccessful. In this 
case, I no longer expect an advantage of user-based framing over item-based framing but 
rather predict that it becomes disadvantageous, because consumers tend to avoid dissimilar 




H4: User-based framing decreases recommendation click-throughs relative to item-
based framing in the presence of cues suggesting self–other dissimilarity.  
To summarize, I posit that, compared with item-based framing, user-based framing 
provides additional information about the preferences of other users that consumers can 
use to reduce their uncertainty about the recommendation; as a result, it encourages them 
to click on it. The informational value of user-based framing and whether it benefits or 
harms recommendation click-throughs depends on the perceived success of taste matching. 
I conducted six studies to test these predictions and the conceptual framework (see 
Appendix for the full results of all the studies). Studies 1a and 1b test H1 (main effect) in 
field experiments with article recommendations. The results affirm the advantages of user-
based framing over item-based framing in a managerially relevant setting. Study 2 tests H2 
that consumption experience functions as a moderator, in a setting that provides painting 
recommendations. For studies 3 and 4, I created book-shopping scenarios to test H3. I find 
consistent support for the hypotheses, whether the attractiveness of the focal product is 
rated by a separate batch of consumers (study 3; analogous to data gathered by companies 
from prior consumers) or by the same consumers (study 4). In study 4, I also leverage 
information about the ages of other consumers to establish a dissimilarity cue that leaves 
user-based framing disadvantageous relative to item-based framing, as predicted in H4. 
Study 5 strengthens the support for H4 by using gender as a different cue of dissimilarity. 
These findings thus add unique theoretical insights and suggest managerial strategies for 
companies.  
Studies 1a and 1b 
I conducted studies 1a and 1b in collaboration with a media company that regularly 
pushes articles to its subscribers on WeChat, the top mobile app in China (Novet 2017). 
These two field studies differ primarily in the item-based framing, which I varied to ensure 
that the user-based framing is responsible for the increased click-throughs. This company 
also offers an ideal context to test the predicted main effect (H1) for two reasons. First, it 
primarily publishes articles about social science research, and its subscribers represent a 




successful in general. Second, this company had not used recommendations before I ran 
study 1a, so I could observe the unique effects of framing, unaffected by prior practice.  
Study 1b, conducted 14 months after study 1a, then offers a conceptual replication 
with completely new stimuli. During the 14-month interval, the company did not adopt any 
other article recommendation and witnessed a 52% increase in the number of subscribers 
(from 70,488 to 107,338) on WeChat. These changes should minimize carry-over effects 
from study 1a to study 1b. Because I had no access to individual users' data, I conducted 
both experiments at the article level (for a similar design, see Gong et al. 2017).  
Study 1a 
Article selection. Before the experiment started, I carefully selected 71 original 
articles that had been previously pushed to all subscribers, according to four criteria. First, 
the number of times people had read each article could not exceed 400, which is low 
compared with the overall average 3,071 (as of August 2017, immediately before study 
1a). Second, the article had been pushed to subscribers at least three months ago, to ensure 
that it was likely to be unfamiliar to most readers. Third, it reported on research on human 
beings, which is the main content the company disseminates, to avoid the risk that the 
article topic would seem odd to readers. Fourth, the article could not contain time- or 
event-specific content (e.g., “Top research of 2016”), because timeliness might interfere 
with the framing effects.  
Study design. I assigned these preselected articles to three conditions: no 
recommendation (N = 9), user-based framing (N = 31), or item-based framing (N = 31). 
The assignment used stratified randomization; each condition includes approximately the 
same percentage of articles published in different years (12% published in 2014, 20% in 
2015, 48% in 2016, and 20% in 2017). This approach helped exclude bias due to 
publication timing. With the control condition (no recommendation), I test whether a 
recommendation per se is effective, regardless of its specific framing. I limit the sample 
size for this control condition, because it is not the focal interest and to maximize the 
statistical power of the contrast between user-based and item-based framings. The 




non-recommended articles (p < .001; see Appendix). I do not discuss the non-
recommended articles further. 
Procedure. I randomly paired one article in the user-based framing with another in the 
item-based framing. The 31 pairs of recommendations then were distributed randomly 
across 31 days. Every weekday, the company pushed one set of articles to all subscribers. 
Each set had a headline article that was most salient to readers, which served as the focal 
article. Each pair of recommended articles was inserted toward the end of the focal article. 
Therefore, the readers would only see the recommendations if they were really interested 
in the focal article and finished reading it. The recommendation consisted of the 
recommendation framing and the title of the recommended article (a hyperlink to click on 
and read). The user-based framing read, “People who like this article also like…,” and the 
item-based framing specified the category that both the focal and the recommended articles 
fell in, “More analyses of scientific research” (all focal articles were in this category). The 
order in which the two framings appeared (one preceded the other) was counterbalanced 
across days.  
To measure click-throughs on the recommendations, I calculated the click-through 





InitialRead is the number of reads of the recommended article before the experiment 
started. It does not differ by the framing condition (p = .543). CurrentRead is the number 
of reads after the experiment started, recorded at four time points of 24 hours, 48 hours, 72 
hours, and 2 weeks after the recommendation, which enables us to determine whether the 
framing effect varies over time. The number of reads of the focal article (FocalRead) also 





Table 1: Means (standard deviations) of number of article reads in study 1a. 
 






experiment 0 (0) 316 (93) 294 (93) 274 (103) 
24 hours  2595 (2280) 343 (125) 306 (96) - 
48 hours 2610 (2404) 344 (126) 307 (97) - 
72 hours 2793 (2564) 345 (126) 308 (97) - 
2 weeks 3071 (2693) 349 (132) 310 (98) 275 (103) 
 
Results. There were 17 missing cases because I could not observe the reads of some 
articles at some time points. Furthermore, I excluded one outlier article in the user-based 
condition from the analysis, because its CTR (M = 19.25% across the time points) was 
disproportionately higher than the average of all the other articles (0.61%). The final data 
set contains 228 observations: 112 in the user-based condition and 116 in the item-based 
condition. Due to the nested structure of the data (articles nested within days), I constructed 
a multilevel model with CTR as the outcome variable and random intercepts at the day 
level. The recommendation faming served as the predictor (0 = item-based, 1 = user-
based). Because time did not moderate the framing effect (p = .919), I focus on the overall 
effect. Consistent with H1, CTR was significantly higher in the user-based condition than 
in the item-based condition (M = 0.72% versus 0.51%; b = 0.22, SE = 0.06, t(196) = 3.79, 
p < .001). Including the outlier article added to the error of estimation but also magnified 
the framing effect (M = 1.26% versus 0.56%; b = 0.70, SE = 0.22, t(199) = 3.11, p = .002).  
Follow-up survey. These results provide initial evidence that user-based framing 
outperforms item-based framing. Recall that I propose this effect arises because, unlike 
item-based framing, user-based framing offers additional informational value by 
suggesting taste matching as part of the recommendation strategy. To determine whether 
readers interpret the two framings in this way, I distributed a follow-up survey to the 
subscribers (N = 780, 67% females, Mage = 24.4 years, SDage = 5.7). Note that I do not 




experiment was conducted on the article level. The survey participants were randomly 
assigned to read the user-based framing (N = 409) or item-based framing (N = 371) that I 
used in the field experiment, then rated the extent to which they agreed with eight 
statements (1 = “strongly disagree,” 6 = “strongly agree”). Half of the statements referred 
to product matching as the basis for the recommendation (e.g., “The recommendation is 
based on articles that are similar to what I have read,” “The recommendation is based on 
the categorization of articles”; Cronbach’s α = .68), whereas the other half referred to taste 
matching (e.g., “The recommendation is based on readers who have similar preferences 
with me,” “The recommendation is based on the categorization of readers”; Cronbach’s α 
= .70). See appendix for all the items.  
To test whether both user-based and item-based framings imply product matching to 
consumers but only user-based framing suggests taste matching as a recommendation 
strategy, I submitted the perceived product-matching and perceived taste-matching scores 
to a 2 (two dependent measurements) × 2 (recommendations framing: user-based vs. item-
based) mixed analysis of variance. A main effect of the measurement arose; participants 
more readily recognized product matching than taste matching as the basis for 
recommendations (F(1,778) = 226.04, p < .001), suggesting that product matching is the 
default perceived recommendation strategy. In addition, I found a significant interaction 
between measurement and framing (F(1, 778) = 9.10, p = .003). In support of my 
reasoning, participants recognized product matching as the basis for the recommendation 
equally in both user-based and item-based conditions (Muser = 4.83, Mitem = 4.82, t(778) = -
0.08, p = .941). However, participants in the user-based framing condition agreed that taste 
matching was a basis for the recommendation to a greater extent than participants in the 
item-based framing condition (Muser = 4.38, Mitem = 4.18, t(778) = 3.44, p = .001). That is, 
user-based framing (versus item-based framing) offers information about taste matching, 
in addition to product-matching information.  
Discussion. Consistent with H1, study 1a demonstrates that framing recommendations 
as user-based rather than item-based attracts more click-throughs in a field setting. It also 
provides support for the notion that perceived taste matching differentiates user- from 




to the additional informational value of user-based framing or if readers instead avoid 
reading more articles in the same category, a response potentially evoked by the item-
based framing that read “More analyses of scientific research.” In study 1b, I thus use a 
different item-based framing operationalization but keep the user-based framing constant. 
If the framing effect in study 1a is due to the informational value of user-based framing, it 
should emerge regardless of whether the item-based framing specifies the article category.  
Study 1b  
Article selection and study procedure. study 1b contains a new set of articles and a 
more generic item-based framing (“Similar to this article”). I selected the recommended 
articles using criteria similar to those I applied in study 1a, except I also required that they 
had not been recommended in study 1a. I increased the constraint on the number of reads 
before recommendation, from 400 to 480 reads, to ensure a decent sample size and account 
for the substantial increase in the number of subscribers to the company. With these 
criteria, I identified 66 articles, half randomly assigned to the user-based and the other half 
to the item-based framing condition. The procedure is the same as in study 1a, and the 
experiment lasted for 33 days.  
Results. Similar to study 1a, I excluded an outlier article in the item-based condition 
that had a peculiarly high CTR (M = 24.35%) relative to the average of all the other 
articles (0.95%). Thus I retain 258 observations in the final dataset. Unlike study 1a, I did 
not balance the year of publication across conditions; more articles published in 2018 were 
assigned to the user-based condition than to the item-based condition (49% vs. 37%, p = 
.073). Therefore, I controlled for publication bias (0 = published before 2018, 1 = 
published in 2018) in the analysis. Using the same multilevel modeling approach as in 
study 1a (time did not moderate the framing effect, p = .945), I found a lower CTR for 
articles published in 2018 than for those published before 2018 (M = 0.58% vs. 1.06%; b = 
-0.49, SE = 0.13, t(223) = -3.80, p < .001). More importantly, controlling for the 
publication year, CTR was higher in the user-based condition than in the item-based 
condition (M = 1.25% vs. 1.06%; b = 0.19, SE = .08, t(223) = 2.44, p = .015). The 
advantage of user-based framing persisted but shrunk in magnitude without the covariate 




article made the framing effect insignificant (b = -0.32, SE = 0.28, t(227) = -1.12, p = 
.262).  
Discussion. Study 1b strengthens the support for H1 by showing that the advantage of 
user-based framing over item-based framing persists when the item-based framing does 
not specify the category of the articles. Taken together, the framing effects observed in 
studies 1a and 1b cannot be accounted for by avoidance of same-category items. I next 
seek to provide evidence for the conceptualization by testing boundary conditions on the 
framing effect.  
Study 2 
With study 2 I examine the prediction that user-based framing outperforms item-
based framing in terms of recommendation CTR for inexperienced consumers but not for 
experienced consumers within a consumption domain (H2). I displayed the article 
recommendations in studies 1a and 1b at the end of the focal article, which guaranteed that 
readers liked the focal article, because they would only see the recommendation if they 
read it to the end. In line with this element, in study 2 I provide product recommendations 
to only to participants who indicate that they like the focal product.  
Participants and design 
I recruited 403 participants located in the United States from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk; 186 females, Mage = 37.3 years, SDage = 11.6). Data from MTurk offer 
reliability comparable to those gathered from offline laboratories (Horton, Rand, and 
Zeckhauser 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). After giving their informed 
consent, participants entered an “Online Museum” study and viewed 50 paintings created 
between the 17th and 20th centuries. Each painting was paired with a hidden 
recommended painting with the same theme (e.g., seascape). The recommendations feature 
either a user-based (N = 195) or item-based (N = 208) framing. All paintings were 
obtained from Google Art Project. I operationalized the proposed moderator, consumption 






Participants viewed 50 focal paintings in a random sequence. Next to each focal 
painting, there was a “like” button in the shape of a heart. I told participants to mark their 
favorite paintings by pressing the button. To make sure they provided their honest 
opinions, I told them that they would enter into a lottery for postcards of their favorite 
paintings. After participants clicked on a “like” button, another button appeared, indicating 
either “People who like this painting also like…” (user-based framing) or “Similar painting 
to this” (item-based framing), depending on the randomly assigned condition. They could 
click on this button to view the recommended painting in a pop-up window, as well as exit 
the pop-up window any time to continue viewing the focal paintings. The CTR for each 
recommendation was calculated as  
CTR = 𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
× 100 
The denominator is the number of participants who liked the focal painting, and the 
numerator indicates how many of them chose to view the recommended painting. The 
CTR varied between 0% and 100%. After participants finished viewing all the focal 
paintings, they saw both the user-based and item-based framing and indicated which one 
they encountered in the “Online Museum” (94% answered correctly). To measure 
participants’ consumption experience, I asked them to indicate how often they visited art 
museums in their life (1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = very often). I 
deliberately chose this single-item measurement to maximize the number of observations 
per level of consumption experience and thus to obtain reliable CTRs to estimate the 
effects of framing. I ended the study with a few demographic questions.  
Results 
Similar to study 1, I conducted the analyses at the level of each recommended 
painting. I calculated the CTR for each recommendation per framing and per level of 
consumption experience, resulting in a dataset with 499 observations. One observation was 
missing because one focal painting in the item-based condition was not liked by any 
participants who never went to art museums. I regressed CTR on framing (0 = item-based, 
1 = user-based), consumption experience (continuous from 1 to 5), and their interaction. 




consumption experience (b = -2.23, SE = 0.97, t(495) = -2.30, p = .022). In support of H2, 
the CTR was higher in the user-based condition than in the item-based condition among 
people who never (b = 7.83, SE = 2.38, t(495) = 3.29, p = .001), seldom (b = 5.60, SE = 
1.68, t(495) = 3.33, p < .001), or sometimes (b = 3.36, SE = 1.37, t(495) = 2.45, p = .015) 
visited art museums. I found no significant difference across framings for those who often 
(b = 1.13, SE = 1.68, t(495) = 0.67, p = .501) or very often visited art museums (b = -1.10, 
SE = 2.37, t(495) = -0.47, p = .642). On average, the CTR was slightly but significantly 
higher in the user-based condition than in the item-based condition (M = 46.63% vs. 
43.23%, F(1,495) = 6.15, p = .014), probably because most participants had rather limited 
experience with arts (median = 2 of 5). Moreover, the CTR decreased with more 
consumption experience (b = -6.70, SE = 0.68, t(495) = -9.78, p < .001) in the user-based 
condition, but this trend was attenuated in the item-based condition (b = -4.46, SE = 0.69, 
t(495) = -6.49, p < .001).  






Study 2 provides support for H2; the advantage of user-based framing over item-based 
framing diminishes for people with more consumption experience. Also consistent with the 
theorizing that more experienced people are less likely to perceive taste matching as 
accurate, I find that greater consumption experience induces a greater decrease in the 
recommendation CTR when it is framed as user-based as opposed to item-based. 
The paradigms I use in studies 1a, 1b, and 2 guarantee that participants like the focal 
product; they only see the recommendation if they finish reading the article or like the 
focal painting. In study 3, I relax this criterion so that all participants receive a product 
recommendation regardless of whether they expressed interest in the focal product; this 
allows us to test for a moderating role of the attractiveness of the focal product (H3).  
Study 3 
 According to the theorizing, liking the focal product is a necessary prerequisite for 
taste matching to be perceived as successful and thus for the advantage of user-based 
framing over item-based framing to arise. To test this assumption explicitly, I vary the 
attractiveness of the focal products and inquire into people's intentions to click on the 
recommendation. I expect the advantage of user-based framing to diminish or even reverse 
for less attractive focal products (H3). Moreover, if focal attractiveness affects perceived 
success in taste matching, it should relate more positively to CTR when the 
recommendations are framed as user-based as opposed to item-based.  
Participants and study design 
Fifty participants located in the United States were recruited from MTurk to 
participate in a study about shopping for novels on Amazon (18 females, Mage = 37.57 
years, SDage = 12.32). The majority (56%) had never purchased a novel on Amazon. I 
manipulated the framing within participants. Unlike the previous studies, the user-based 
framing emphasized users’ actions (“Consumers who viewed this book also viewed…”) 
rather than likes. This variation is purposeful; the decision to view a book’s webpage 
might be driven merely by the appearance of the cover, but liking a book requires 




setup might be less engaging than previous studies. However, it taps into an important 
situation in which consumers are merely browsing products without concrete goals.  
Book selection 
I took a convenience sample of 50 novels from the “Literature and Fiction” category 
on Amazon that had garnered fewer than 200 reviews before the experiment started, which 
were presumably unfamiliar to most of the participants. A pretest with a separate batch of 
50 participants from MTurk (23 females, Mage = 33.6 years, SDage = 8.4) confirms that 
these books are unfamiliar to MTurk workers (maximum mean familiarity is 2.14 of 10, 
where higher values indicate more familiarity). From the 50 books, I randomly selected 25 
candidates as focal books and the other 25 candidates as recommended books. Then I 
randomly paired a candidate from the focal set with another from the recommended set. I 
aimed for an equal number of focal–recommended pairs per framing condition for the 
Study. 
The pretest demonstrates that the distribution of mean attractiveness scores across the 
25 focal books centered around the scale midpoint (M = 5.21 of 10, SD = 0.64). I selected 
6 focal books (3 per framing condition) that represent this distribution for extrapolation (M 
= 5.04, SD = 0.64). The attractiveness scores of the selected books do not differ by framing 
condition (p = .941).  
Procedure 
In the main study, participants viewed the preselected focal books in random 
sequences, each accompanied by a preassigned recommended book. For each 
recommendation, participants indicated whether they would click on the recommended 
book, on a 10-point scale (1 = “Definitely not,” 10 = “Definitely yes”). After they finished 
viewing all the recommendations, they selected the reasons that they had seen for 
recommendation: (1) user-based framing, (2) item-based framing, (3) both, or (4) neither. 
The study ended with demographic questions.  
Results 
I excluded eight participants who recalled neither the user-based nor the item-based 
framing. This exclusion is important, because it rules out the possibility that the framing 




less attractive focal books. The final data set includes 252 observations (6 books nested 
within 42 participants). I regressed participants’ intention to click on the recommended 
book on three predictors: recommendation framing, the score of focal attractiveness as 
obtained from the pretest, and their interaction. The regression model allowed for a 
random intercept for each participant.  
I found a significant interaction effect between framing and focal attractiveness (b = 
0.65, SE = 0.31, t(207) = 2.09, p = .039). Consistent with H3, the advantage of user-based 
framing decreased for less attractive focal books. To illustrate, when focal attractiveness 
was one standard deviation (SD) above the mean, user-based framing increased people’s 
intention to click on the recommendation relative to item-based framing (b = .87, SE = .42, 
t(207) = 2.07, p = .039). No framing effect emerged at the mean level of focal book 
attractiveness (b = 0.22, SE = 0.29, t(207) = 0.77, p = .441) or at one SD below the mean 
(b = -0.43, SE = 0.43,  t(207)  = -1.00, p = .317). For very unattractive books (1 out of 10), 
the model even predicted that user-based framing lowered click-through intentions 
compared with item-based framing (b = -4.22, SE = 2.16, t(207)  = -1.96, p = .052). 
Furthermore, in support of the theorizing, focal book attractiveness predicted intentions to 
click for the user-based framing (b = 1.09, SE = 0.44, t(207) = 2.48, p = .014), but this 
trend was absent for item-based framing (b = -0.01, SE = 0.29, t(207) = -0.02, p = .981).  
When all cases were included, the moderation by focal attractiveness was in the same 
direction and marginally significant (t(247) = 1.76, p = .080). See Figure A2 in the 
Appendix for the similar patterns with and without data exclusion.  
Discussion 
 In support of H3, study 3 establishes focal product attractiveness as a boundary 
condition for the advantage of user-based framing over item-based framing. It renders 
insights into the framing effect in a setting where consumers are merely browsing products 
without explicit signals of their interest in the focal product. In study 4, I aim to replicate 
this finding using a different procedure; I also test whether presenting a salient cue of self–
other dissimilarity makes user-based framing disadvantageous relative to item-based 





Cue of self–other dissimilarity 
 The majority of MTurk workers are at least 25 years of age (Ipeirotis 2010), so I 
use the age group “18–24 years” as a dissimilarity cue. That is, for this Study, a bar graph 
indicates other consumers’ ages, under the title “Age of interested consumers,” with three 
bars: “18–24,” “25–55,” and “above 55.” I highlighted the “18–24” bar and informed 
participants that it represented the age of consumers who also viewed the recommended 
book. A pretest (N = 101; 62 females, Mage = 36.7 years, SDage = 12.4) confirmed that most 
MTurk workers (89%) are older than 24 years, who also perceive themselves as more 
similar to other consumers in their age group than to people in the 18–24 age group (p < 
.001).  
Participants and study design 
I recruited 360 participants from MTurk, who are at least 25 years old (169 women; 
Mage = 37.6 years, SDage = 1.19), and randomly assigned them to three conditions: user-
based framing (“Consumers who viewed this item also viewed…”), item-based framing 
(“Similar to this item”), and user-based framing with the age group dissimilarity cue.  
Procedure 
The procedure is similar to that in study 3, with two differences. First, instead of 
presenting participants with preselected books, I allowed them to self-select three focal 
books to view from nine books, thereby simulating browsing behavior in online stores. 
Second, the attractiveness of focal books was rated by the participants, not based on the 
score from the pre-test, which captures the heterogeneity of ratings across individuals. At 
the end of the study, participants evaluated how attractive they found each focal book 
using a 10-point scale (1 = “Not at all,” 10 = “Very attractive”; M = 6.94, SD = 1.96). The 
attractiveness was not influenced by the assigned conditions (p = .353; overall M = 6.94, 
SD = 1.96).  
Results 
As in study 3, I excluded participants (N = 133) who could not recall the framing they 
saw, leaving a data set with 680 observations (3 books nested within 227 participants). I 




condition and dissimilarity cue condition, each of which could interact with the rating of 
the focal book’s attractiveness. Because the dissimilarity (age group) cue did not interact 
with focal attractiveness (p = .845), and including this interaction term did not increase 
model fit (p = .364), I dropped it from the analysis to focus on the main effect of 
dissimilarity. Figure 3 plots the results.  
Figure 3: Regression Results of study 4. 
 
In line with the Study 3 results, I found a significant interaction of focal book 
attractiveness and recommendation framing when the dissimilarity cue was absent (b = 
0.24, SE = 0.10, t(451) = 2.32, p = .021). Specifically, user-based framing (versus item-
based framing) increased participants’ intention to click on the recommended book when 
focal attractiveness scored one SD above the mean (b = 0.70, SE = 0.36, t(224) = 1.93, p = 
.055) but not when it scored at the mean (b = 0.24, SE = 0.30, t(224) = 0.78, p = .434) or 
one SD below the mean (b = -0.23, SE = 0.36, t(224) = -0.64, p = .526). For very 




relative to item-based framing (b = -1.18, SE = 0.68, t(224) = -1.74, p = .084). In addition, 
focal attractiveness related more positively to click-through intentions in the user-based 
condition (b = 0.50, SE = 0.12, t(451) = 6.51 , p < .001) than in the item-based condition (b 
= 0.26, SE = 0.06, t(451) = 4.01, p < .001). Critically, when the dissimilar cue was present, 
user-based framing (versus item-based framing) decreased intentions to click on 
recommended books (b = -0.89, SE = 0.32, t(224) = -2.84, p = .005).  
When all cases were included, I replicated the reversal of the framing effect (t(357) = 
-3.11, p = .002). The moderation by focal attractiveness was in the same direction but not 
significant (t(717) = 1.58, p = .113). See Figure A3 in the Appendix for the similar patterns 
with and without data exclusion. 
Discussion 
Study 4 replicates the findings of Study 3 with a different procedure, strengthening 
the support for H2. Furthermore, consistent with H3, I find that the presence of a cue 
suggesting dissimilarity with other users makes user-based framing disadvantageous 
compared with item-based framing, regardless of the attractiveness of the focal books. To 
provide additional support for H4 and in line with prior research (Naylor, Lamberton, and 
West 2012), in Study 5 I used gender composition as a different cue of self-other 
dissimilarity. Moreover, I include both dissimilar (most other users are a different gender) 
and similar (most other users are the same gender) cue. In line with the theorizing and 
prior research (Naylor, Lamberton, and West 2010), I anticipate that cueing consumers 
with their similarity to other users will have an effect similar to user-based framing that 
lacks information about the identity of other users.  
Study 5 
Study design 
Study 5 follows the design of study 2 (painting) but in the domain of books. I selected 
57 books of various genres (e.g., comics, thrillers, philosophy) that were not available on 
the market when the study was conducted (i.e., “coming soon” category), so participants 
were unlikely to be familiar with them. I selected another 57 coming-soon books as 
recommendations and paired them with the focal books. Participants viewed the book 




clicking on a heart button. Then the recommendation button popped up, indicating either 
“Consumers who like this also like…” in the user-based condition or “Similar book to 
this” in the item-based condition. In both conditions, I told participants that the 
recommendation came from readers on Amazon. Moreover, participants had the chance to 
win a book that they marked as “would like to read.” 
In the user-based condition, next to the recommendation button, participants also saw 
the gender composition of people who liked the focal book. Of the 57 focal books, 21 were 
predominantly liked by males (95%–100%), and 21 were mainly liked by females (95%–
100%), so 42 books offered a cue of self–other similarity, and 42 provided a cue of self–
other dissimilarity (see Table 2). In addition, 15 neutral books were liked about equally by 
both genders (45%–55% males). These neutral books serve two purposes. First, their 
presence creates a more realistic book-shopping scenario, in which consumers encounter 
books that attract either gender and those that appeal to both genders. Second, the neutral 
books, combined with similar-cue and dissimilar-cue books, increase the power of the 
contrasts relative to the item-based condition (i.e., same 57 books compared across 
conditions). For the similar-cue books, I expect to replicate the moderating role of 
consumption experience from study 2. For the dissimilar-cue books, in line with study 4, I 
anticipate that user-based framing will decrease CTR.  
Table 2: Design of study 5 (user-based framing) 
 
 Similar cue Dissimilar cue 
Male  
participants 
21 books liked by 95% to 100% 
men 




21 books liked by 95% to 100% 
women 
21 books liked by 95% to 100% 
men 
Total 57 books  
(42 plus 15 neutral books) 
57 books  
(42 plus 15 neutral books) 
 
Participants and procedure 
Three-hundred sixteen MTurk workers participated in the study (159 males, Mage = 




experience with book shopping on the item, “How often do you visit books stores (online 
or offline) in general?” with the same scale from Study 2. Compared with participants in 
Study 2 (paintings), participants in Study 5 had more experience with books (median = 3 
versus 2; significantly higher mean, p < .001). The study ended with a few demographic 
questions. 




I calculated separate CTRs for similar-cue books, dissimilar-cue books, and the item-
based frame books. I then regressed the CTRs on two dummy predictors: similar-cue 
books and dissimilar-cue books, each of which could interact with consumption 
experience. Similar to study 4, the interaction between the dissimilar cue and consumption 
experience was insignificant (p = .975), and including the interaction term did not increase 




full regression results). The results, as plotted in Figure 4, showed that for similar-cue 
books, as in study 2, there was a significant interaction between framing and experience (b 
= -4.88, SE = 1.63, t(623) = -3.00, p = .003). Specifically, user-based framing was more 
advantageous for participants who never visited bookstores (b = 8.91, SE = 4.35, t(623) = 
2.05, p = .041), but this advantage decreased and even reversed as they gained more 
experience (seldom b = 4.03, SE = 2.98, t(623) = 1.35, p = .176; sometimes b = -0.85, SE = 
2.03, t(623) = -0.42, p = .676; often b = -5.73, SE = 2.15, t(623) = -2.66, p = .008; very 
often b = -1.61, SE = 3.24, t(623) = -3.28, p = .001). In support of H4, user-based framing 
became disadvantageous, relative to item-based framing, for dissimilar-cue books (b = -
6.55, SE = 1.94, t(623) = -3.38, p < .001).  
Discussion 
Using the paradigm from study 2, study 5 conceptually strengthens support for H4. 
Cueing consumers to recognize self–other dissimilarity leads to a disadvantage of user-
based framing relative to item-based framing. This study also generalizes the role of 
consumption experience to the domain of books.  
General Discussion 
 Consumers frequently receive product recommendations from recommender 
systems, and companies often frame them as user-based (e.g., “People who like this also 
like…”) or item-based (e.g., “Similar to this item”). I compare these two framings while 
keeping the actual recommendation constant (or randomized, as in the field studies) and 
thereby demonstrate the advantages of user-based framing over item-based framing in 
terms of recommendation CTR. In two field experiments with the mobile app WeChat 
(study 1a and 1b), I establish that recommending articles with user-based (versus item-
based) framing increases recommendation CTR. Study 2 identifies consumption 
experience as an important boundary condition for the framing effect; studies 3 and 4 show 
that the effect shrinks and even reverses for unattractive focal products. Finally, studies 4 
and 5 reveal that cueing consumers to their dissimilarity with other users makes user-based 
framing less effective than item-based framing. Table 3 summarizes the studies and the 
hypotheses they support. I took care to test the predictions using various product categories 




practices to establish the generalizability and robustness of the effects. The results in turn 
offer several contributions to literature, practical suggestions for companies that use 
product recommendations in their marketing strategy, and directions for further research.  
Table 3: Overview of studies. 
 






Click-through rate of recommended 
books (0% to 100%) 
H1 
Study 2 Behavioral 
experiment 
Click-through rate of recommended 
paintings (0% to 100%) 
H2 
Study 3 Scenario 
experiment 
Intention to click on recommended 
books (1 to 10) 
H3 
Study 4 Scenario 
experiment 
Intention to click on recommended 
books (1 to 10) 
H3 and H4 
Study 5 Behavioral 
experiment 
Click-through rate of recommended 
books (0% to 100%) 
H2 and H4 
 
Theoretical implications 
Prior investigations of recommender systems primarily focus on technical designs 
(e.g., Ansari, Essegaier, and Kohli 2000; Ariely, Lynch, and Aparicio 2004; Hennig-
Thurau, Marchand, and Marx, 2012) or the consequences of their use (e.g., Bodapati 2008; 
Fleder and Hosanagar 2009; Pathak et al. 2010). Little research has explored the ideal 
ways for companies to communicate the basis of recommendations to their consumers. 
This research represents an initial attempt to fill this gap by comparing the effects of user-
based and item-based framings on recommendation CTR. Simply changing the framing of 
recommendations can have an impact on this metric. I thus emphasize the importance of 
studying the effect of framing, in addition to the technical aspects of the underlying 
algorithms.  
The current findings also advance understanding of consumers’ interpretations of 
recommendations. As the follow-up survey in study 1a shows, consumers recognize 




framing. In two pilot studies (see Appendix), I also find that product matching is perceived 
as a more dominant recommendation strategy than taste matching. This primacy of product 
matching might result from the visual salience of products, relative to the latency of 
consumers: On a typical product webpage, consumers see products, not other consumers, 
and can directly compare the products but not themselves with others. The results of the 
survey show that the difference between the two framings is due to taste matching. By 
signaling that taste matching is part of the recommendation strategy, beyond product 
matching, user-based framing offers additional informational value for consumers that, 
presumably, mitigates their uncertainty about their satisfaction with the recommendation.  
More broadly, this work contributes to advice-taking research (Iyengar, Van den 
Bulte, and Lee 2015; Müller-Trede et al. 2018; Sinan and Walker 2012). Prior studies 
focus on how consumers take advice from other users; I investigate consumers’ tendency 
to follow recommendations generated by algorithms. Consistent with findings that indicate 
that consumers adopt others’ choices (Morvinski, Amir, and Muller 2017) and opinions 
(e.g., online reviews; Chen and Xie 2008; Zhu and Zhang 2010), I demonstrate that 
mentioning others’ preferences can encourage consumers to click on recommended 
products. However, a fundamental difference between following recommendations and 
adopting others’ preferences is that the former depends on consumers’ understanding of 
the “black box” of recommender systems, whereas the latter pertains to how consumers 
navigate the social world. Recommendations framed as user-based (versus item-based) 
might exert more influence on consumers by adding a social component to the 
recommender system.  
Managerial implications 
Companies heavily invest in recommender systems; global spending is estimated at 
$5.9 billion in 2019 (International Data Corporation 2019). This research suggests that it is 
not only the technical aspects of recommender systems that matter; the framing of 
recommendations exerts a notable influence as well. Companies might fail to maximize 
recommendation click-throughs if they rely only on item-based framing. Managers must 
develop effective recommender systems but also devote attention to how to frame the 




algorithm and the recommended product constant, comes with nearly zero cost, unlike 
developing and improving technical aspects of recommender systems.  
The field studies suggest a general advantage of user-based framing over item-based 
framing in a setting where consumers’ tastes are homogenous and they show deep interest 
in the focal item (e.g., they read the entire article). Studies 2 to 5 document situations in 
which this advantage can diminish or even reverse. These boundary conditions are 
particularly important for companies to consider when deciding on the framing that they 
want to utilize. First, consumers with less consumption experience are particularly 
susceptible to the impact of recommendation framing. Managers can identify these 
consumers by analyzing their past behavior and infer the degree to which they possess 
consumption experience in a specific domain. Consumers who seldom listen to classical 
music probably know little about this genre, for example, so they likely follow the lead of 
other classical music fans and exhibit high responsiveness to user-based framing.  
Second, in situations in which consumers are merely browsing on a website and do 
not necessarily express interest in focal products (as it was the case in the paradigms of 
studies 3 and 4), utilizing a user-based framing is unlikely to be advantageous compared to 
an item-based framing. Conversely, a user-based framing is more advantageous than item-
based framing for attractive products; it can trigger consumers to click the 
recommendation when they already have expressed some interest in the focal product, 
such as by reading an article or watching a video to the end. Managers can infer the 
attractiveness of focal products by tracking consumers’ real-time behavior and thereby 
decide whether to prioritize user-based framing. Moreover, considering that user-based 
framing appears particularly beneficial for products that receive high ratings from prior 
consumers, if managers cannot easily infer a particular target consumer’s attitude toward 
the focal product, they still can decide whether to prioritize user-based framing, depending 
on prior consumers’ reactions to it. 
Third, user-based framing is less effective than item-based framing when it is coupled 
with a cue suggesting that others (on whom the recommendation is based) are dissimilar to 
the recommendation recipient. This insight is critical for companies that present prior 




others differ from the target consumer in salient ways, the target consumer might avoid a 
recommendation framed as user-based. To maximize the value of user-based framing, 
managers either should not display any cues suggestive of differences or else should 
selectively emphasize other consumers who are similar to the target in some important 
aspect. If these displays of information cannot be adjusted, managers might compare the 
backgrounds of the target and others, then choose a user-based framing only if a match 
exists and item-based framing if not.  
Fourth, consumers more readily recognize product matching than taste matching (as 
shown in the follow-up survey for study 1a). However, the advantages of user-based 
framing stem from consumers’ awareness of the taste-matching effort and their recognition 
of successful taste matching. Therefore, it is important for companies to make user-based 
framings salient, such as by increasing the font size or underscoring the framing, if they 
intend to leverage its value to the fullest. 
Caveats and calls for further research 
I purposefully compare generic user-based and item-based framings, which are 
common in the marketplace, to generate externally valid and practically relevant insights. 
However, both framings can vary in their specificity. For example, user-based framing can 
refer to a specific group of users, such as friends (e.g., Spotify’s “what friends are listening 
to”), which may alter how likely consumers are to perceive taste matching as successful. A 
generic user-based framing is unlikely to prompt consumers to question their similarity 
with ambiguous other users, but referring to specific friends could more easily trigger 
perceptions of dissimilarity. Typically, consumers know their friends’ tastes and therefore 
recognize fine-grained differences in them. In that sense, referring to friends’ preferences 
might backfire for user-based framing, making it less effective than item-based framing. I 
encourage continued research into this practically relevant issue.  
Similarly, companies might specify standards for item categorization. Instead of 
merely mentioning that the recommended item is similar to a focal item or that the two fall 
in a rather broad category (e.g., romantic novels), companies might emphasize books by 
the same author or movies by the same director. Noting the primacy of product matching 




little influence on the difference between user-based and item-based framing. However, it 
is possible that item categorization variations could affect certain consumers; for example, 
those with greater consumption experience within a product category might find item-
based framing more attractive if the item categorization is narrower, because they are 
motivated to deepen their knowledge of specific categories (Clarkson, Janiszewski, and 
Cinelli 2013).  
Alternatively, recommendation framing might be analyzed along dimensions other 
than an emphasis on different inputs (i.e., users or items), such as whether it refers to the 
target consumer’s own past behavior as a basis for recommendation. Spotify uses 
“Because you have listened to X” in parallel with a more generic “Similar to X” to explain 
its recommendations. Does explicitly referring to consumers’ own tastes make a 
difference? On the one hand, personalized explanations (“you” and “your” behavior) might 
cause consumers to perceive greater effort by the recommender system and the 
recommendation as more self-relevant. On the other hand, personalization could raise 
consumers’ awareness that their private information has been collected and prompt 
reactance to the recommendations. Additional research could compare different 
recommendation framings along multiple dimensions to achieve a fuller understanding of 
their roles. 
Although I explore three theoretically derived, practically relevant moderators, a 
variety of factors could shift the perceived success of taste matching and thus moderate the 
framing effect. According to social influence literature, for example, consumers tend to 
perceive more self–other dissimilarity as their distance grows (Meyners et al. 2017). Their 
perceptions of taste-matching success thus might depend on their geographical distance. 
Another pertinent factor is consumers’ perception of the size of the group of other users 
(Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005), as defined by the type of product. Consumers 
interested in a niche product may infer a small group of interested other users; those 
considering a mainstream product likely presume a large group. Larger groups can be more 
influential but also appear more heterogeneous in their tastes (Latane 1981). Studies of 




I suggest user-based framing is advantageous compared to item-based framing 
because it signals taste matching and provide support for this theorizing in product 
domains in which taste is an important decision criterion (articles, paintings, and books). I 
speculate that for products primarily differentiated by quality (for instance, utilitarian 
products such as laptops), consumers’ reaction to recommendations could be less sensitive 
to their perception of taste matching; in such instances, the informational value of taste 
matching is likely to diminish. Future research could examine if the advantage of user-
based framing relative to item-based framing depends on whether taste or quality is the 
more salient decision criterion for a particular product.  
Importantly, the more consumers are familiar with the digital world, the more 
experienced they are with recommender systems and might develop their own 
understanding of how these systems work. For instance, ethnographic work on 
recommendations shows that experienced consumers tend to game with the recommender 
system to generate desired recommendations (Devendorf and Goodman 2014). This 
suggests that experienced consumers might interact with recommender systems more 
rationally and might deliberately choose to click or not to click on recommendations with 
the purpose to improve the quality of future recommendations. For instance, consumers 
might resist a recommendation related to the opposite gender’s taste not only because they 
perceive a mismatch with their own taste, but also to avoid misidentification by the 
recommender system and to prevent any future recommendations associated with the other 
gender. The implication is that consumers who are more experienced with recommender 
systems could be more likely to scrutinize taste matching efforts. I see this as a fruitful 
avenue for future research.  
As a concluding remark, in a blog post, Netflix has acknowledged that it provides 
explanations for why it has recommended a movie or show in order to gain consumers’ 
trust (Amatriain and Basilico 2012). The current research reiterates this notion, by 
revealing that when companies explain a recommendation to their consumers, the decision 
of which framing to use, user-based or item-based, is crucial in terms of its impact on 






Study 1a: recommended versus non-recommended articles 
To ensure the recommendation is effective, I compared the percentage increase in 
reads of recommended and non-recommended articles (increase = current read – initial 
read). The initial reads of all articles were recorded before the experiment started, and then 
the current reads were recorded two weeks after the recommendation. The current reads of 
non-recommended articles were recorded after the experiment ended. 
In Figure A1, the distribution of the percentage increase is extremely positively 
skewed in each condition. Therefore, I conducted a Kruskall-Wallis test to compare the 
distribution of the increase across conditions; it differed significantly across conditions 
(H(2) = 23.59, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that non-recommended articles 
had lower mean rank (5.67) than articles recommended with the user-based framing 
(43.42; Z = -4.83, p < .001) and those with the item-based framing (37.39; Z = -4.06, p < 
.001). A comparison of the medians indicates the same pattern of results (p = .001).  





Measurements of taste matching [product matching]  
1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree 
The recommendation is based on readers who have similar preferences with me [articles 
that are similar to what I have read]. 
The recommendation is based on the categorization of people [articles]. 
The recommendation is based on readers [content]. 
The recommendation system takes into account my preferences [the type of articles]. 
 
Full regression results 
Table A1: Regression results of studies 1a and 1b. 
 Study 1a Study 1b 
Intercept 











Publication bias  
(1 = published in 2018, 0 = published before 
2018) 
- -0.49*** (0.13) 
Notes: Coefficients (0 to 100%) with standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .001, **p < 








Table A2: Regression results of studies 2 and 3. 
Study 2: Click-through rate (0 to 100%) 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 46.63 0.97 25.25 <.001 
Framing  
(1 = user-based, 0 = item-based) 
3.35 1.37 2.45 .015 
Experience (mean-centered) -4.46 0.69 -6.49 <.001 
Framing by experience -2.23 0.97 -2.30 .022 
Study 3: Click-through intention (1 to 10) 
 b SE t p 
Intercept 
(with random intercepts within individuals) 
5.44 0.27 20.43 <.001 
Framing  
(1 = user-based, 0 = item-based) 
0.22 0.29 0.77 .441 
Focal attractiveness (mean-centered) -0.01 0.29 -0.02 .981 






Table A3: Results of studies 4 and 5. 
Study 4: Click-through intention (1 to 10) 
 Model 1 (in the main text) 
Model 2 
Intercept 
(with random intercepts within individuals) 5.16***(.21) 5.16***(.22) 
User-based (no cue) 0.24(.30) 0.24(.30) 
User-based (dissimilar cue) -0.89**(.32) -0.90**(.32) 
Focal Attractiveness (mean-centered) 0.26***(.06) 0.25**(.08) 
User-based (no cue) by Focal Attractiveness 0.24*(.10) 0.25*(.11) 
User-based (dissimilar cue) by focal attractiveness - 0.03(.13) 
Study 5: Click-through rate (0 to 100%) 
 Model 1 (in the main text) 
Model 2 
Intercept 35.03***(1.39) 35.03***(1.39) 
User-based (similar cue) -2.75(1.92) -2.75(1.92) 
User-based (dissimilar cue) -6.55**(1.94) -6.55**(1.94) 
Experience (mean-centered) -2.35*(.98) -2.33*(1.14) 
User-based (similar cue) by Experience -4.88**(1.63) -4.88**(1.63) 
User-based (dissimilar cue) by Experience - -0.05(1.69) 
Notes: Coefficients (1 to 7 in Study 4 and 0 to 100% in Study 5) with standard errors in the 






Studies 3 and 4: plotted multilevel regression results with and without data exclusion 
Figure A2: Results of study 3 without (left) and with (right) data exclusions. 
 
 




Participants were randomly assigned to read either the user-based framing or the item-
based framing after watching a focal video or listening to a focal song. After reading the 
framing, they responded to a question, “The product was recommended to me based 




cells in Table A4 below display the numbers of participants selecting each option. Product 
matching remains dominant for user-based framing; most participants selected it, even 
when they could only choose one option. Yet user-based framing increases awareness of 
taste matching (video: 𝜒2(𝑁 = 117) = 11.20, p = .004; music: 𝜒2(𝑁 = 178) = 7.36, p = 
.025). I also asked participants about their perceptions of the overlap between the focal and 
recommended products. In the bottom row of Table A4, perceived overlap does not differ 
by the framing condition. Additional analyses indicate no reliable relationship between 
perceived overlap and desire to watch the recommended video (Pearson’s r(117) = .28, p = 
.033) or listen to the recommended song (r(179) = .06, p = .444). 
Table A4: Summary of the results of the pilot studies. 
 
Video recommendation (MTurk participants) 
 User-based framing Item-based framing 
 “Based on what people who 
like … also like, we 
recommend the following 
video to you” 
“Based on the content of this 
video/genre of…, we 
recommend the following video 
to you” 
Based on product 
matching 36 53 
Based on taste 
matching 13 2 
Random 7 6 
Perceived product 
overlap (1–7) by 
framing 
Muser = 4.85, Mitem = 5.16; t(115) = -0.83, p = .406 
Song recommendation (Prolific participants) 
 “People who like … also like” “Music of the same style as …” 
Based on product 
matching 52 49 
Based on taste 
matching 27 13 
Random 14 24 
Perceived product 
overlap (0–100) by 
framing 





















Chapter 4 is organized as follows. I start by analyzing the conceptual difference 
between the vice–virtue and vice–lesser vice choice settings and identify the factors that 
would or would not influence the choice between the vice and the lesser vice. I also 
emphasize the importance of studying consumed quantities in the vice–lesser vice choice 
setting. The proposed model was tested in two well-controlled experiments.  
Theoretical Background 
Virtues, vices, and lesser vices 
Past research on self-control of food consumption has primarily focused on the choice 
between the vice and the virtue. Vices are unhealthy and hedonic while virtues are healthy 
and utilitarian (for a review, see Vosgerau, Scopelleti, and Huh 2019). Lesser vices that 
remain in the unhealthy category but are less unhealthy than the typical vice, such as 
sugar-free donuts versus regular donuts, are much less studied and conceptually 
indifferentiable from virtues (Werterbroch 1998). Per definition, a vice scores higher on 
short-term gratification but lower on long-term health benefits relative to a virtue (Ainslie 
1975; Myrseth and Fishbach 2009). Whether the virtue falls within the healthy or the 
unhealthy category should not make any difference. In this research, however, I put 
forward that lesser vices are uniquely different from healthy virtues. Throughout the paper, 
‘vice’ exclusively refers to the unhealthy, hedonic food and ‘lesser vice’ to the food that is 
similarly indulgent but incurs lower costs on health.  
Drivers of choice in vice–virtue versus vice–lesser vice contexts 
Classic self-control conflicts of the vice–virtue type are characterized by a palpable 
conflict between short-term and long-term consequences and self-control success lies in 
maximizing one’s long-term outcomes (Wertenbroch 1998). One crucial reason why 
people struggle doing so is that they are greatly present-focused. As people hyperbolically 
discount future gains, they often favor the option that provides the greatest immediate pay-
off (Loewenstein and Elster 1992). Yet, when substituting a vice with a lesser vice (e.g., a 
sugar-free donut), the perceived conflict between short-term gratification and long-term 
health outcomes should be much weaker or even absent. Because companies try to make 
lesser-vice products taste as similar to the original vice products as possible to keep 




lesser vice. That is, regardless of whether consumers choose the vice or the lesser vice, 
they can have their short-term craving satisfied1. Goal systems theory suggests that the 
fulfillment of the short-term goal should trigger consumers to pursue the competing long-
term goal (Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 2005; Shah, Kruglanski, and Friedman 2003). 
Following this reasoning, inasmuch as consumers see both the vice and the lesser vice as 
indulgent, they would focus on the health outcomes of their choices and the choice of 
lesser vices would be determined by the strength of the health goal.  
This distinction is important, as previous work consistently showed that factors that 
draw attention to the immediate, short-term outcomes tend to weaken self-control, whereas 
those that direct attention to the future, long-term outcomes tend to enhance self-control 
(Fujita et al. 2007; Loewenstein 1996). For example, encouraging people to make their 
food choices well in advance (i.e., advance ordering) separates the moment of choice from 
the moment of consumption, thereby reducing the potential impact of immediate 
gratification while increasing the saliency of long-term goals. As a result, it is a highly 
effective intervention to increase the choice share of healthy over unhealthy food options 
(Miller et al. 2017; Read and van Leeuwen 1998; VanEpps et al. 2017). As outlined above, 
contrary to the vice–virtue trade-off, the vice–lesser vice setting is much less characterized 
by the consideration of immediate gratification. Therefore, I expect that an intervention 
such as advance ordering, of which the effectiveness is predicated on changing the relative 
saliency of the short-term versus long-term outcomes, is unlikely to influence the choice 
between the vice and the lesser vice.  
If consumers are choosing between the vice and the lesser vice according to their 
health consequences, what would differentiate the two in terms of healthiness? I posit that 
the crucial characteristic that distinguishes lesser vices from vices is their lower calorie 
density. For healthy and unhealthy food, their primary difference lies in the nutritional 
value such as the supply of fibers, protein, and vitamins. Calorie density is not a good 
 
1 Although lesser vices are likely viewed as less tasty than regular vices, the argument here is that choosing 
either would bring immediate pleasure. Therefore, even when selecting lesser vices does not maximize the 
immediate pleasure, I suggest that consumers would primarily focus on whether a food option brings immediate 
pleasure rather than how much the pleasure is. Further support for this argument (from an ancillary study) will be 




proxy of healthiness here, as healthy products could even contain more calories than 
unhealthy ones (e.g., 100 grams of almonds contain more calories than 100 grams of 
crisps). Hence, in vice–virtue choice contexts, the calories differ qualitatively, rendering 
their total amount of little importance. Conversely, in the vice–lesser vice choice context, 
calories differ mostly quantitatively, and calorie density becomes of unique importance. 
Prior research shows that individuals differ in their sensitivity to calorie density, which is 
captured in the tendency of restrained eating (van Strien et al. 1986; Elfhag, Tynelius, and 
Rasmussen 2007). Thus, I predict that consumers who are more restrained in their eating 
behavior would be more inclined to substitute the vice with a lesser vice.  
To summarize, I predict that eliminating the present bias by decoupling choice and 
consumption (advance versus immediate ordering) would not bolster the preference for the 
lesser vice but that the sensitivity to calorie intake would. Next, I turn to another equally, if 
not more, important behavioral consequence in the vice–lesser vice setting: consumed 
quantities. 
Post-choice consumption: effects of choices, timing of choice, and restrained eating 
Typically, self-control success (versus failure) is operationalized as consumers’ 
propensity to choose the healthy (versus unhealthy) food. The qualitative difference in 
nutritional value between healthy and unhealthy food renders the quantity of calorie intake 
of little relevance relative to the exact choice. Therefore, in the vice–virtue choice setting, 
choice is often viewed as a better proxy for self-control success compared to consumed 
quantities. In contrast, when an unhealthy food is substitutable by a lesser vice, the total 
amount of consumed calories is a crucial proxy for the overall success in self-control; if 
the lesser-vice choosers end up consuming more calories, self-control still fails.  
What is the impact of the choice between the vice and the lesser vice on the overall 
calorie intake? To answer this question, we must consider the effect of choice on 
consumption volume (e.g., grams). One possibility is that choosing the lesser vice would 
decrease consumed grams and thus reduce consumed calories. This is because consumers 
might behave in consistency with their choices, monitoring their eating process more 
closely if they select the lesser vice. Past research hints at this possibility by showing that 




Chen 2017). Yet, there is no explicit evidence for the choice-consumption consistency in 
self-regulation. Another possibility is that choosing the lesser vice would increase 
consumed grams and even consumed calories. There is evidence that serving consumers 
lighter food can lower their anticipated guilt and subsequently increase their consumed 
quantities (e.g., low-fat M&M’s, Wansink and Chandon 2006; Koenigstorfer and 
Baumgartner 2015). Whether this finding is generalizable to consumers’ proactive choices, 
however, remains an open question. The last possibility is that choosing the lesser vice 
would have no impact on the number of grams consumed but would still lower the calorie 
intake by grace of the lesser vice’s lower caloric density. The rationale is that while some 
deliberation might go into the choice between the vice (e.g., regular chips) and the lesser 
vice (e.g., light chips), the eating behavior itself is a much more mindless, automatic 
process (Galak and Loewenstein 2013). This prediction is also consistent with recent 
research showing that consumers under-weigh the influence of consumed quantities on 
healthiness, suggesting that they may not perceive the health threat from larger consumed 
quantities as much as that from the food of choice (Liu et al. 2019). These competing 
predictions are tested in this chapter.  
Apart from the effect of choices on consumption, would there be any impact from the 
timing of choice and restrained eating on consumed quantities? Given my prediction of a 
null effect of advance ordering on choices, I do not expect it to influence consumption. As 
for restrained eating, I predict that it would lower the calorie intake by encouraging the 
choice of lesser vices and reducing cravings for unhealthy ingredients (Burton, Smit, and 
Lightowler 2007). Note that it is also possible to examine the direct effects of the timing of 
choice and restrained eating on consumption, which I do not draw any prediction of given 
the lack of literature. However, it would be reasonable to expect the absence of direct 
effects if consumers indeed pay little attention to their eating processes after making a 
choice. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1, including the paths with and 
without specific predictions.  
General Method 
I conducted two studies to examine the predictions and questions posed in Figure 1. 




among consumers (Coelho do Vale, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2008). In both studies, I 
manipulated the timing of choice (advance versus immediate before consumption) between 
participants and measured the individual difference in restrained eating after the main 
study. The studies were conducted with standardized procedures in a laboratory, 
eliminating potential confounds such as social influence and minimizing noises in the 
measurements (see study procedure for details). To limit the variance in choices and 
consumed quantities and to make sure participants care about their health, I conducted the 
studies with females only (Argo and White 2012). I aimed to reach at least 100 participants 
for each timing condition.  
Two methodological challenges have to be addressed for the current research. One is 
how to test one path while controlling for the others in the model (Figure 1). I tackle this 
with a structural equation modeling approach and estimating all the paths simultaneously 
(Muthén 2011). Second, significance testing alone would not suffice to support null 
effects. As a complement, I calculated the Bayes factor (BF01) for all insignificant effects 
based on the model fit (𝐵𝐹01 = 𝑒(𝐵𝐼𝐶𝐻1−𝐵𝐼𝐶𝐻0)/2, Jarosz and Wiley 2014). BF01 is the ratio 
of the likelihood of a null hypothesis given the data to the likelihood of the alternative 
hypothesis. There is evidence for the null hypothesis when BF01 is above one and the 
evidence is stronger as the value of BF01 increases. Based on Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria, BF01 
above 10 indicates strong evidence for the null hypothesis and BF01 above 100 is decisive.  
Study 1 
In study 1, I operationalized the vice as regular potato chips and the lesser vice as 
light chips. The choice set includes two popular flavors of chips (classical/paprika), each 
with a regular version (5.31/5.41kcal per gram; 181g per pack) and a light version 
(4.8/4.9kcal per gram, about 9% lower in calorie density than the regular versions; 176g 
per pack), all of the same brand. A pretest with a separate group of participants from the 
same population confirms that light chips are viewed as the ‘lesser vice’: they are rated as 
unhealthy in general (M = 2.90 on a 7-point scale with 1 = not healthy at all and 7 = 
extremely healthy; p < .001 compared to the midpoint of the scale) but less unhealthy 
compared to regular chips (M = 1.95; difference from light chips: t(42) = 5.39, p < .001). 
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ray lines represent predicted null effects, black lines represent predicted positive and negative effects, and the dashed lines are 




Participants and procedure 
Two-hundred and twenty female undergraduates from Rotterdam School of 
Management (Mean of age = 20.16, SD = 1.33) participated in the study in exchange of 
credits. I informed participants that they would snack on potato chips while watching a 
video in the lab. The purpose of the study was described as to provide feedback for a snack 
company.  
The study consisted of two parts, a morning survey and a late afternoon lab session, 
always administered on the same day (see Figure 2). Participants received the morning 
survey at around 9:00AM, which remained open until 11:30AM. In the survey, I asked 
participants in the advance (versus immediate) condition to choose the chips (versus the 
video) that they would like to eat (versus watch) in the afternoon lab session. Participants 
then reported when and what they ate last time. None of them had lunch before filling out 
the morning survey.   
The afternoon lab sessions were scheduled between 3:00PM and 5:30PM, when the 
afternoon crunch is likely to kick in. Each participant was picked up individually and 
seated in a separate cubicle in front of a computer. All participants first re-read the cover 
story about the snack company. Afterwards, I asked participants in the advance (versus 
immediate) condition to choose a video to watch (versus the chips to eat). Thereby, 
participants in both conditions made a choice immediately before consumption, which 
excludes any effect from the mere action of choosing on subsequent self-control 
(Baumeister et al. 1999). Participants then received a full pack of the chips of their choice. 
They could eat as much as they like while watching the video. While the video was 
presented as four different titles at the choice stage, in reality all participants watched the 
same video that lasted 650 seconds. This ensures that consumed quantities are not affected 
by the content of the video or the duration of eating. When the video ended, the 
experimenter took away the remaining chips and let participants complete a questionnaire. 






Figure 2: Study procedure. 
 
 
The post-consumption questionnaire started with filler items on how participants 
thought about the chips they ate and the video they watched, followed by questions on 
when participants ate last time and whether they had chips before coming to the lab. None 
of the measures differed between the timing condition (ps > .5).  More importantly, 
participants completed the measurement of restrained eating on a five-point scale (e.g., 
“Do you watch exactly what you eat?”, Cronbach’s α = .90; a 10-item subscale of Dutch 
Eating Behavior Questionnaire by van Strien et al. 1986). In the end, participants were 
asked about their age and debriefed.  
Results 
I specified a model in Mplus as shown in Figure 1. Calorie intake was the product of 
the consumed grams and the calorie content of the selected pack of chips (M = 199.28 
kcal, SD = 98.40). The model was estimated with the maximum-likelihood approach and a 
probit link for the choice of chips (0 = regular, 1 = light). For purposes of efficiency, I 
summarized the path estimates and standard errors in Figure 3 and focus on the statistical 
significance below. For null effects, I reported both p values and Bayes factors (BF01).  
Table 1 presents the descriptives.  
Advance ordering. As expected, the timing of choice did not predict the choice of 
chips (p = .441, BF01 = 11.02). In both timing conditions, the share of light choosers was 
about the same as the share of regular choosers (57 out of 111, or 51% in the advance 
condition and 50 out of 109, or 46% in the immediate condition). Also consistent with the 
prediction, the timing of choice did not have an overall effect on the calorie intake (p 
= .916, BF01 = 128.44; no direct effect either: p = .487, BF01 = 11.66).  
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Restrained eating. In support of the prediction, more restrained eaters were more 
likely to choose light chips (t(213)  = 2.54, p = .011). In turn, choosing light chips led to 
lower calorie intake (t(213) = -4.23, p < .001). Overall, restrained eaters consumed less 
calories (t(213) = -2.19, p = .029) and 67% of the total variance was accounted for by the 
indirect effect via the choice of light chips. There was no direct effect of restrained eating 
on calorie intake (p = .295, BF01 = 9.92).  
Consumed grams. To examine the consumption process more closely, I replaced 
calorie intake with consumed grams and re-estimated the model. I see that choice of light 
chips reduced consumed grams (t(213) = -2.72, p = .006). The timing of choice and 
restrained eating had no direct effect on consumed grams (p = .437, BF01 = 10.97 and p 
= .382, BF01 = 10.10 respectively).  
Discussion 
Study 1 confirms the predictions that restrained eating encourages the choice of the 
lesser vice and, through choice, lowers overall calorie intake, while the timing of choice 
has no effect. According to Jeffreys (1961), there is strong evidence for the null effect of 
advance ordering on the choice of the lesser vice (BF01 between 10 and 20) and decisive 
evidence for its null effect on calorie intake (BF01 > 100). I also find that neither advance 
ordering nor restrained eating has any direct impact on consumed calories.  
In addition, study 1 shows that the choice of the lesser vice reduces both consumed 
calories and consumed grams, suggesting behavioral consistency among the lesser-vice 
choosers. Nevertheless, caution is warranted here. Participants in this study received the 
chips in their original packaging. As a consequence, the ‘light’ label remained salient in 
the consumption stage and might serve as a reminder for healthy eating. Indeed, past 
studies frequently utilize such visual reminders to prompt consumers to mind their eating 
processes (e.g., posters highlighting calorie intake by Haws and Winterich 2013; flyers 
featuring a healthy recipe by Papies et al. 2014). In study 2, I remove the difference in 
packaging between the vice and the lesser vice.  
Another explanation for the lower consumption among lesser-vice choosers is based 
on the means-to-goal priming, which suggests that choosing the lesser vice, as a mean to 
meet the health goal, could temporarily make the health goal more salient (Shah and 
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Kruglanski, 2003; van Osselaer & Janiszewski, 2012). To test this, I manipulated the 
accessibility of the health goal immediately before consumption in study 2. If the effect of 
choice on consumption that I observed in study 1 is due to the means-to-goal priming, 
priming consumers with the health goal should 1) lower the consumed quantities and 2) 
eliminate the effect of choice on consumption. However, if the effect is due to the salience 
of packaging, the goal-priming procedure should exert no effect.   
Study 2 
Participants and procedure 
Three-hundred and forty-nine female undergraduates from the same participant pool 
of study 1 (Mean of age = 20.09, SD = 1.13) participated in the study in exchange of 
credits. Instead of potato chips, participants were asked to choose between two bowls of 
M&M’s of the same flavor (chocolate), one presented as the regular version (4.80 kcal per 
gram) and the other as the light version (4.58 kcal per gram, about 5% lower in calorie 
density than the regular) based on their incidental caloric difference. The bowls looked 
exactly the same and each bowl had 213 grams of M&M’s. The procedure followed study 
1. The pretest shows that both light and regular M&M’s were viewed as unhealthy (M = 
1.75 and 1.27 out 7 with the lower value indicating more unhealthiness; ps < .001 
compared to the midpoint) but the light version appeared less unhealthy (t(39) = 4.69, p 
< .001).  
Before participants in the main study received the M&M’s of their choice, they went 
through a scrambled-sentence task. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to 
scramble 10 sentences with health-related words (e.g., “She has a healthy baby”, “She is 
on a diet”), while the others assigned to sentences with neutral words (e.g., “She has a 
beautiful baby”, “She is on a flight”). The priming procedure did not affect or moderate the 
effect of other factors on consumption (ps > .7), suggesting that the post-choice saliency of 
the health goal does not explain the effect of choice on consumption that was observed in 
study 1 (also see McCarthy et al. 2018 for the difficulty to detect priming effects with the 
paradigm). I collapsed the data across the priming conditions and followed the same 




I estimated the same model as in study 1 and summarized the results in Figure 3. 
Table 1 presents the descriptives.  
Advance ordering. Consistent with study 1, the timing of choice did not influence the 
choice of M&M’s (p = .577, BF01 = 15.93; 66 out of 173, or 38% versus 77 out 176, or 
44% chose the light over regular in the advance versus immediate condition). In addition, 
it did not have an overall effect (p = .805, BF01 = 296.78) or a direct effect on calorie 
intake (p = .907, BF01 = 18.65). 
Restrained eating. Restrained eating increased the preference for light M&M’s 
(t(342) = 8.45, p < .001). In turn, choosing light M&M’s resulted in slightly lower calorie 
intake (t(342) = - 1.52, p = .141; although the effect was not significant, the p value was 
close to 10% and much lower than the null effects; BF01 = 0.33 rendering substantial 
evidence for the alternative hypothesis). Overall, restrained eaters consumed fewer calories 
(t(342) = -2.04, p = .041) and 77% of the total variance was accounted for by the indirect 
effect via the choice of light M&M’s. There was no direct effect of restrained eating on 
calorie intake (p = .540, BF01 = 15.71).   
Consumed grams. Different from study 1, choosing the lesser vice (light M&M’s) did 
not lower consumed grams (p = .360, BF01 = 12.29). In line with study 1, the timing of 
choice and restrained eating had no direct effect on consumed grams (p = .914, BF01 = 




Table 1: Descriptives of choice and consumption in studies 1 and 2. 
 
Study 1 
 Light choosers Regular choosers 
Advance condition 
(N = 111) 
n = 57 
Mean (SD) of calorie = 186.34 
(89.65) 
Mean (SD) of grams = 38.39 
(18.46) 
n = 54 
Mean (SD) of calorie = 
218.57 (100.35) 
Mean (SD) of grams = 40.72 
(18.74) 
Immediate condition 
(N = 109) 
n = 50 
Mean (SD) of calorie = 152.58 
(74.31) 
Mean (SD) of grams = 31.46 
(15.25) 
n = 59 
Mean (SD) of calorie = 
233.69 (100.48) 
Mean (SD) of grams = 43.61 
(19.88) 
Retrained eating (M = 2.87 out of 5; SD = 0.89) did not differ by the timing of order (p 
= .741).  
Study 2 
 Light choosers Regular choosers 
Advance condition 
(N = 173) 
n = 66 
M (SD) of consumed calorie = 
189.65 (120.53) 
M (SD) of consumed grams = 
41.41 (26.32) 
n = 107 
M (SD) of consumed calorie 
= 212.10 (131.53) 
M (SD) of consumed grams 
= 44.19 (27.40) 
Immediate condition 
(N = 176) 
n = 77 
M (SD) of consumed calorie = 
181.06 (137.24) 
M (SD) of consumed grams = 
39.53 (29.97) 
n = 99 
M (SD) of consumed calorie 
= 215.18 (129.69) 
M (SD) of consumed grams 
= 44.83 (27.02) 
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Study 2 replicates the main findings of study 1 in that restrained eating strengthens 
the preference for the lesser vice and lowers the overall calorie intake. In contrast, the 
timing of choice has no influence. Also consistent with study 1, I do not find any direct 
effect of the independent factors on consumed quantities. Importantly, keeping the 
packaging constant, I find a null effect of choice on consumed grams. This suggests that 
the effect observed in study 1 is likely driven by the saliency of the packaging of the lesser 
vice during consumption.  
Taken together, studies 1 and 2 provide strong to decisive evidence (Jeffreys 1961) 
for the proposed null effect of advance ordering on the preference for lesser vices. To 
exclude the possibility that the null effects are due to methodological flaws, I evaluate the 
studies against the criteria established by Frick (1995). As shown in Table 2, the study 
features and results satisfy the relevant criteria, lending further credence to the null effects. 
The only unlisted criterion is to have many trials within each participant, which I deem not 
feasible for the manipulation of timing in the lab setting.  
Table 2: Frick’s (1995) criteria for validating the null effect and the support. 
 
Criteria  Support 
Large number of 
participants  
 109 to 176 participants per timing condition 
Major sources of 
variance are 
controlled for 
 Well-controlled laboratory setting; fixed duration of eating; 
same-gender participants 
Large and effective 
manipulation 
 Unambiguous manipulation of the timing of choice (for 
similar manipulation, see vanEpps et al. 2016) 
Sensitive 
measurements 
 Choice and calorie intake are sensitive to the influence of 
restrained eating. 
No floor or ceiling 
effect 
 The choice share of lesser-vice products falls between 38% 
and 51% across timing conditions; average calorie intake 
falls between 196.49 and 203.53 kcal, out of the entire range 





This research strives to understand both the drivers and the consequences of 
substituting vice food with a lesser vice. It moves away from the unhealthy-healthy 
dichotomy and captures a more nuanced picture of food consumption. Two studies 
consistently show that, contrary to what has been found in the vice–virtue domain, 
inserting a delay between choice and consumption, which is supposed to reduce the 
present-bias, does not prompt consumers to substitute the vice with a lesser vice. Instead, 
restrained eating is consistently associated the choice of the lesser vice. Moreover, 
restrained eaters end up consuming less calories, an advantage largely driven by their 
stronger preference for the lesser vice rather than their direct control over the consumption 
process.  
The current research makes notable contributions to the literature on consumer self-
control. First, it draws a distinction between the lesser vice and healthy virtues. The classic 
definition of vice and virtue is continuous and relative, equating the lesser vice with the 
virtue and disregarding the healthy or unhealthy categorization of food (Wertenbroch 
1998). Accordingly, the factors that have been shown to enhance the preference for healthy 
food are assumed applicable to the lesser-vice substitutes. This research challenges this 
assumption. I suggest that the trade-off between long-term health goals and short-term 
indulgence goals is much less salient in the vice–lesser vice choice setting, and indeed I 
find that tuning down the focus on immediate gratification does not increase the preference 
for lesser-vice products. On the contrary, I argue that the calorie difference is much more 
salient in the vice–lesser vice trade-off and find that consumers who tend to be more 
concerned with calorie intake make wiser decisions.  
This argument, grounded in Goal System Theory, has much broader implications than 
what the current study focuses on. It implies that, similar to the choice between the vice 
and the lesser vice, the choice between the virtue and the greater virtue should also differ 
from the traditional vice–virtue choice. Since both the virtue and the greater virtue (e.g., 
soymilk and no-sugar soymilk) can satisfy the health goal, consumers should look for the 
difference in tastes between the options. Indeed, my ancillary study shows that, consumers 
primarily consider the difference in tastiness between food options when choosing between 
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the virtue and the greater virtue but consider the difference in healthiness when choosing 
between the vice and the lesser vice (see Appendix for details of the study). Put differently, 
whether consumers mentally categorize the food as healthy or unhealthy fundamentally 
changes the way they make decisions. This highlights the need for a refined theorizing of 
self-control problems in the food domain. It also suggests that the interventions and 
campaigns aimed at improving consumers’ interests in the lesser vices or the greater 
virtues should selectively focus on the health benefit or the superior taste. I plan to 
continue my research along this line. 
This research also highlights the value of studying choice and consumption as chain 
effects. As alluded to earlier, there is little research that examines food choice and 
consumption in conjunction. For instance, while it has been shown that misleading labels 
on unhealthy food can liberate consumers to consume more (Irmak et al. 2011), it is 
unclear whether the pattern would persist if the labeled food is actively chosen rather than 
passively accepted by consumers. The current research suggests that consumers may not 
think beyond choices and the exact influence of choice on consumption is subject to 
product features such as the packaging. By investigating choice and consumption jointly, 
future research would not only be able to generate novel insights into consumer 
psychology but provide more relevant recommendations to companies and policy makers. 
Finally, the reported findings illustrate the difficulty of rationing food intake at the 
consumption stage. Although restrained eaters tend to substitute the unhealthy food with a 
lesser vice, they do not exert much direct control over their eating process. This dovetails 
with the notion that consumers are insensitive to their physiological changes during food 
consumption and the subjective feeling of satiation is largely constructed by the ongoing 
consumption experience (Redden 2015). Apparently, people find it easier to substitute a 
vice for a lesser vice than to limit the amount they consume. This only reinforces the value 
of lesser vices in the marketplace: restrained eaters do end up consuming fewer calories, 











Ancillary study  
The study was to test whether there is any asymmetry in the predictive power of 
perceived healthiness and tastiness on the choice of food within healthy and unhealthy 
categories.  
I first conducted a pretest to determine the choice sets for the main study. I collected 
100 common grocery items and presented their names and images in random sequences to 
50 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk (19 females; mean of age = 36.18; SD of age = 
11.69). For each item, I asked participants to report whether they think it falls within the 
healthy or the unhealthy category. They are allowed to select "I don't know" if they cannot 
decide. I selected 53 food items where the categorization achieves at least 80% consensus 
among the participants. This selection resulted in 12 unique pairs of unhealthy food 
options, 12 unique pairs of healthy food options, and 12 unique healthy-unhealthy mixed 
pairs.  
The main study was conducted in two phases. In phase one, I recruited 114 
participants (36 females; Mean of age = 35.72, SD of age = 10.51; none had taken part in 
the pretest). They viewed all the pre-selected food items, one item per page, and evaluated 
the healthiness as well as the tastiness of each item (1 = Not healthy/tasty at all, 9 = Very 
healthy/tasty). Two days later, the same participants were recruited into phase two. They 
viewed all the food pairs, one pair per page, in three blocks (unhealthy, healthy, and mixed 
pairs). Because the main purpose was to compare within-category choices, I randomized 
the sequence of unhealthy and healthy blocks and kept the mixed block in the end.  
Participants were asked to imagine they were doing regular grocery shopping for 
themselves and select the food they prefer within each pair. Importantly, I told them that 
the options within each pair are comparable in price and portion size. To encourage 
participants to indicate their real preferences, I also promised a lottery for a $50 Walmart 
e-giftcard on top of the regular payment.  
For analyses, I excluded 11 participants who reported allergies to or avoidance of one 
or more food options in the pre-selected set. Including them into analyses did not alter the 
pattern of results. I utilized the differences in perceived healthiness and tastiness between 
the food options within each pair, which was observed in phase 1 of the study, to predict 
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food choices that were observed in phase 2. For instance, within a pair of food options A 
and B, choice would be the dependent variable (choosing A = 1, choosing B = 0) and 
(Healthiness of A - Healthiness of of B) would be the difference score for healthiness and 
(Tastiness of A - Tastiness of B) be the difference score for tastiness. All scores were 
standardized before analyses. Given that the predictors (healthiness vs tastiness) and food 
choices are nested within the type of choice-set (unhealthy, healthy, or mixed) within each 
individual, I conducted a multilevel regression with choice being the binary dependent 
variable.  
There was an overall significant three-way interaction among the difference score, the 
measurement (tastiness or healthiness), and the type of choice (p < .001). Within each type 
of food pairs, there was significant two-way interaction between the difference score and 
the measurement (ps < .004). Specifically, within healthy pairs, the taste-difference score 
predicted the food choice (E = 0.45, SE = 0.05, z = 9.56, p < .001) but the health-difference 
score did not (E = 0.01, SE = 0.05, z = 0.13, p = .897). In contrast, within unhealthy pairs, 
the health-difference score significantly predicted the food choice (E = -0.11, SE = 0.04, z 
= 2.81, p = .005) but the taste-score did not (E = -0.04, SE = 0.03, z = -1.39, p = .165). 
Critically, the variance of the health score does not differ from the variance of the taste 
score in the healthy (Levene’s test F(1, 2470) = 2.32, p = .128) and unhealthy pairs (F(1, 
2470) = 2.12, p = .146), suggesting that the observed asymmetry cannot be explained by 
the difference in the variance of the scores.  
The results of mixed pairs resemble the pattern of healthy pairs. However, the 
variance of the health score was significantly larger than the variance of the taste score 
within mixed pairs (Levene’s F(1, 2470) = 37.77, p < .001). This suggests that the results 

























The world consumers are living in is increasing globalized, digitalized, and saturated 
with temptations. As a result, consumers are surrounded by multiple languages, automated 
recommendations, and health reminders. Substantial research has been conducted to 
understand how consumers navigate in this world, by looking at how they evaluate 
products and make decisions in different language contexts (e.g., Karataş 2019; Vidal, 
Costa, and Foucart 2019), how to generate the best recommendations to individual users 
(Kim et al. 2017), and how to drive consumers towards a healthy diet (Cadario and 
Chandon 2019).  
Despite the wealth of research in these fields, I put forward that more research needs 
to be done in order to promote the welfare of consumers as a collective. First, although 
there is extensive research on (un)ethical behavior and bilingualism as separate fields, few 
have linked the two. Second, automated recommendations contribute tremendously to 
consumers’ new discoveries, but it also engenders the concern that consumers may never 
be exposed to a broader set of new products. This problem has been considered by 
computer scientists looking at the algorithmic ‘black box’, yet rarely viewed as a problem 
addressable by marketing communications. Third, research on healthy eating has been 
dominated by how to improve the share of healthy choosers, leaving out a large proportion 
of cases in which consumers are deciding between two hedonic options that do not 
qualitatively yet quantitatively differ in healthiness. To fill these gaps, this dissertation 
uncovers the intricate influence of language on consumer dishonesty (Chapter 2), develops 
framing of recommendation as a tool to maximize consumer traffic to recommendations of 
novel products (Chapter 3), and pinpoints the self-control dynamic when consumers are 
choosing between the vice and the lesser vice (Chapter 4). By doing so, these essays take a 
step further in realizing the potential of consumer research to advance the collective 
welfare of consumers. Meanwhile, the advancement is accompanied by greater benefits to 
companies, in terms of the management of losses incurred by dishonest consumers, 
consumer engagement with recommendations, and the marketing of lesser-vice products. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I would not reiterate the implications of each chapter (as 
well summarized in the general discussion sections of chapters 2 to 4) but provide a vision 
about what these studies mean to future research on consumer welfare and the research of 
contextual influence in general.  
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Implications for Research in the Backdrop of Globalization, Digitalization, and 
Self-Control Problems 
The viewpoint of consumer welfare 
A focus on the collective welfare of consumers would broaden the horizon of the 
current consumer research and bring about exciting questions. One phenomenon that 
concerns consumer welfare throughout history and particularly in this digital age is the 
spread of misinformation. Consumers are motivated to stay informed and to receive high-
quality information. However, this is frequently sabotaged by social factors. One factor 
that has been overlooked yet of high relevance to the rise of digitalization is the device 
consumers use to share information. Nowadays consumers have news at their fingertips, 
either shown on their computers or mobile devices, and they are bombarded by 
information from various sources. Assessing the quality of the information could be a 
daunting task, especially when sharing is just one click or tap away. How would device 
influence consumers’ sharing of information of different quality? One of my ongoing 
projects (not collected in this book) is to answer this question. My analysis of a large-scale 
Twitter dataset shows that, counter to the lay intuition that using mobile devices lowers the 
quality of shared content, the use of mobile devices increases the proportion of content 
from high-quality sources being shared as compared to non-mobile devices. Follow-up 
experiments reveal that the change of device does not alter consumers’ ability to discern 
the quality of content, but rather magnifies their intention to share high-quality content 
with others. Paradoxically, this magnified intention can result in less sharing of objectively 
high-quality content that is subjectively low-quality. This work shows that a contextual 
shift (mobile versus non-mobile device) does not always lead to desirable behavior 
(sharing high-quality content) but strengthens consumers’ goodwill against the undesirable 
which can lead to either desirable or undesirable behavioral outcomes.  
Another phenomenon that has been touched upon in Chapter 4 but deserves more 
expanded research is the marketing of greater virtues and lesser vices that abound in the 
marketplace and help move consumers inches toward a healthier life. The exact meaning 
of a healthy diet is heterogeneous across individuals and situations (Vosgerau, Scopelliti, 
and Huh 2019). While some may find themselves struggling between the healthy and 
unhealthy categories, others may choose within the virtue or the vice category. Chapter 4 
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implies that there is an asymmetry in consumers’ concern over healthiness and tastiness of 
food options when they are choosing within the vice or the virtue categories. Drawing on 
the goal systems theory, I predict that consumers would weigh tastiness more when 
choosing between the virtue and the greater virtue but healthiness more when choosing 
between the vice and the lesser vice. Chapter 4 suggests one way to test this asymmetry 
(the ancillary study). Here I discuss two other ways to test it. The first is to examine 
individual differences in their focus on the immediate hedonic value and the long-term 
health value of food consumption. Prior research suggests that the present focus and the 
future focus are related yet dissociable: They differ in the neurological roots (McClure et 
al. 2004) and can be captured by different constructs (e.g., external eating versus restrained 
eating, Van Strien 1986). Following my prediction, individuals who are more mindful of 
healthiness should be more likely to choose the lesser vice over the vice. In contrast, 
individual differences in their focus on the hedonic value of consumption should matter 
less to the choice of lesser vices. When the choice is between the virtue and the greater 
virtue, the pattern should reverse, such that individuals who are more mindful of tastiness 
should be more likely to choose the greater virtue over the virtue, yet individual 
differences in their focus on the healthiness of consumption should matter less. Another 
way to test the asymmetry is by comparing the effectiveness of marketing slogans that 
emphasize taste or health benefits. Specifically, health-oriented slogans should be more 
effectively moving consumers from virtues to greater virtues as compared to from vices to 
lesser vices, whereas taste-oriented slogans should do the opposite. Empirical work along 
these lines would better inform managers and policy makers of how to market the 
increasingly available healthier alternatives.  
In addition, I believe consumer research can contribute a lot more to the 
understanding of the restricted variety of consumption in the presence of automated 
recommendations. While this is frequently a result of algorithm bias, it is possible that 
consumers react to algorithmic recommendations in a self-handicapping way that 
undermines the diversity of recommendations they receive. Nowadays algorithms are 
flexible enough to incorporate consumer behavioral signals to personalize 
recommendations. This means that consumers can tell recommender systems if they want 
more diversity, such as by searching for products that are not typically recommended or 
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avoiding recommended products of the same category. In two preliminary studies, I find 
that the extent to which consumers proactively signal their preference for diversity depends 
on their perception of the recommender being human- or algorithm-driven. In specific, 
consumers who tend to believe their recommenders are algorithm-driven are less likely to 
seek variety for more diverse recommendations in return. Importantly, this effect is 
specific to variety-seeking; it does not emerge for other types of interactions with the 
recommender system, such as consumers’ searching for what they like and deleting what 
they dislike, for the purpose of receiving more accurate recommendations. This suggests 
that consumers may miss out opportunities to receive diverse recommendations from 
algorithms. Consumers’ suboptimal interaction with algorithms can result from two 
different perceptions. On the one hand, consumers may perceive their interaction with 
algorithms as more private, which would lower their motivation to manage an interesting 
and balanced self-image and make them cling to their defaults (Ratner and Khan 2002; 
Young, Vosgerau, and Morewedge 2014). In this case, the solution to the self-imposed 
constraint on diversity would lie in enhancing the perceived publicity of interaction with 
recommender systems, such as by humanizing the algorithmic recommender. On the other, 
consumers may see algorithmic recommenders as worse at learning the diversity of 
preferences as compared to human recommenders. If this is true, explicit cues of 
algorithmic learning capacity may be required to encourage consumers to pursue variety 
proactively. Understanding how to encourage consumers to signal their preference for 
diversity would benefit consumers in the long term, allowing them to discover the beauty 
in a wide range of products, to acquire knowledge from different sources, and to see the 
opinions of various parties.  
The intersections between globalization, digitalization, and overconsumption 
The movement towards a more globalized, digitalized, and health-minded world 
paves the way for novel research that bridges these fields. The crossovers give rise to 
burning questions that, to my knowledge, not being answered but would concern 
consumers even more in the future. One area of my interest is consumer self-regulation of 
food choices in the presence of recommendations. Recent research shows that consumers 
tend to follow recommendations even when the recommended is an inferior option (Banker 
and Khetani 2019). Would the ubiquity of recommendations make consumers pick 
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whatever is recommended without much deliberation? If so, consumers may feel less 
accountable for their choices and attribute their self-control failures or successes to the 
recommender system. This is likely to disrupt self-regulation and to make the consumption 
of vices guilt-free (Hagen, Krishna, and Mcferran 2017). Meanwhile, it is possible that the 
mere act of taking recommendations creates an illusion of choice (Hadi and Block 2014), 
which can make consumers over-claim their self-control credits (if the recommendation is 
filled up with virtues) and loosen their subsequent control (Khan and Dhar 2006). Future 
research can look at self-control behavior in the presence of recommendations and 
examine the long-term effects of relying on recommendations on eating habits.  
Another interesting phenomenon is how consumers interact with artificial intelligence 
(AI) in different languages. An increasing number of consumers own voice assistants, such 
as Alexa, Siri, and Google assistant, which they can talk to and give commands to. How 
would the language consumers speak shape their interaction with AI? Would they 
outsource different types of tasks to their voice assistants when using their first or second 
languages? For instance, would using a second language liberate consumers to outsource 
tasks that they feel uncomfortable outsourcing to machines in the first language, such as 
the tasks related to their core identity (Garcia-Rada et al 2018; Leung, Puntoni, and 
Paolocci 2018)? In addition, would the language of choice change consumers’ non-verbal 
communication with AI, such as by changing their pitch, volume, and tempo of their 
speech? Would consumers feel less repulsive by machines attempting to imitate humans 
speaking when the interaction is in their second language as opposed to the first language? 
Are non-native speakers less able to tell the difference between AI and human voices? 
These are all interesting questions for future research.  
Lastly, little research has examined how language affects ongoing food consumption, 
although eating frequently involves social interaction in different languages. While 
previous research shows that ordering in a foreign language prompts consumers to choose 
the virtue over the vice (Klesse et al. 2015), it is unknown whether choosing vices in a 
second language dissociates negative self-conscious feelings, such as guilt and shame, 
from choosing the vice. Reduced guilt has been shown to increase the intake of unhealthy 
food (Duke and Amir 2018), suggesting that foreign language may lead to more unhealthy 
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consumption. However, it is also possible that speaking a foreign language facilitates 
healthy eating: because speaking a foreign language is cognitively taxing, it can activate 
inhibition in general (Tuk, Trampe, and Warlop 2011) and make consumers more mindful 
of their eating processes. Future research can disentangle these competing predictions.  
Implications for the Approach to Studying Contextual Influences on Consumer 
Behavior 
From the average towards the idiosyncratic 
The findings presented in this book speak to the view that the influence of contextual 
factors (such as the language context) on consumer behavior is subject to consumers’ 
idiosyncrasies in cognition: The effect of language on consumers’ opportunistic lying is as 
malleable as the moral intuition of individuals (Chapter 2). In addition, consumers do not 
unanimously flock to recommendations with a more informative explanation, even when 
the explanation implies a social norm. Instead, they proactively evaluate the quality of 
recommendations by reflecting upon who they are, who the other users are, and product 
features (Chapter 3). Finally, temporal distancing from consumption does not bring a more 
rational self out of the same individual when the food options are equally tempting 
(Chapter 4).  
The social-cognitive approach advanced in this book contrasts with the other popular 
approach that portrays contextual factors as mechanical determinants of consumer 
behavior. This competing view is reflected in how subtle shifts in the context can induce 
behavioral changes, and even more famously, in the power of Nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008). This mechanical approach may have a particular appeal when applied to marketing. 
Part of the appeal is economic; if consumer behavior can be transformed by a uniform 
contextual change, other costly strategies such as promotions or personalization would 
seem unnecessary. It has an even greater appeal at the psychological level, as it promises 
the potential to change consumers in a way that is immune to their conscious control. 
The appeal of the competing perspective, however, obscures the nature of consumers, 
who are sophisticated, thoughtful, and capricious. Indeed, recent research has started to 
look at why Nudges fail in some cases on some individuals (Sunstein 2017) and how 
consumers interpret choice architectures (Job, Tannenbaum, and Fox 2017). In the same 
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vein, this dissertation advocates the agency of consumers and suggests that averaging 
contextual effects across individuals disguises their intricacies. The most obvious example 
is Chapter 4, which shows that advance ordering is not as effective in the vice–lesser vice 
choice setting as in the vice–virtue setting. Another example is the role of language. The 
published research on bilingualism often suggests a unidirectional effect of using a foreign 
language. Contradictory results are discarded as “no effect” instead of a fruitful 
opportunity for refined theorizing (e.g., Alempaki et al. 2019). Chapter 2, however, takes 
into account the variation of moral intuitions and enriches the understanding of the 
language effect.  
The benefit of considering consumer idiosyncrasies extends beyond the theoretical 
level. Companies gather and hoard data about consumers and the contexts they are in. 
Understanding the interaction between consumers and their contexts would help 
companies maximize the usage of their data and generate deeper insights. For instance, 
Chapter 3 suggests that it is not wise to frame all recommendations as user-based; instead, 
similar to personalized recommendations, the framing of them should also be tailored to 
who the users are and the attractiveness of focal products.  
From the static towards the dynamic 
The view that consumer-context interaction determines behavior also implies that the 
contextual influence should evolve across time or situations instead of being static. I 
identify two kinds of dynamics that deserve more investigation. First, it is not well 
understood how consumers, once situated in a specific context, behave differently when 
they have different choices to make. This is partially captured in Chapter 2, where 
consumers assigned to different language conditions had to decide whether to cheat at 
various magnitudes. This kind of dynamic can be purely behavioral in the sense that it does 
not necessarily affect how contexts exert psychological influences (e.g., meta-cognitive 
uncertainty) but rather change the observed effects on behaviors.  
The other type of dynamic, in contrast, is at the cognitive level and much less studied 
in consumer research. With repeated exposures to the same context, consumers could 
develop their own understanding of the context, especially when they have little 
experience with the context or any established knowledge about that. Take algorithmic 
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recommendations as an example. One common scenario that is not captured in any of my 
studies in Chapter 3 is when consumers keep clicking on the recommendations, such as 
binge-watching videos recommended by a website. In this situation, consumers could slip 
into a narrow category of products, be fed up with the recommendations, and even develop 
an aversion to the underlying algorithm. This implies that the framing effect of 
recommendations would evolve with consumers’ knowledge and experience with 
recommendations. Another example is the use of mobile versus non-mobile devices. 
Recent research shows that consumers trust reviews sent from mobile devices more than 
those from computers (Grewal and Stephen 2019). However, longitudinal evidence shows 
the opposite in the long term (Ransbotham, Lurie, and Liu 2019). This kind of dynamic, 
resulting from consumer learning processes, is prevalent in reality yet much less studied in 
the lab. I wish to extend the time span of my future investigations and examine the 
dynamic of consumer behavior.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation investigates how to promote consumer welfare in the 
age of globalization, digitalization, and overconsumption. The findings and thoughts 
presented in this book hopefully shed some light, bright or dim, on the complex causes of 
consumer behavior, and provide some useful insights for managers and policy makers 
alike. They represent the start, instead of the closure, of a larger, more ambitious program 
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The world consumers are living in is increasing globalized, digitalized, and saturated 
with temptations. As a result, consumers are surrounded by multiple languages, automated 
recommendations, and health reminders. Substantial research has been conducted to 
understand how consumers navigate in this world, by looking at how they evaluate 
products and make decisions in different language contexts, how to generate the best 
recommendations to individual users, and how to drive consumers towards a healthy diet. 
Despite the wealth of research in these fields, I put forward that more research needs 
to be done in order to promote the welfare of consumers as a collective. First, although 
there is extensive research on (un)ethical behavior and bilingualism as separate fields, few 
have linked the two. Second, automated recommendations contribute tremendously to 
consumers’ new discoveries, but it also engenders the concern that consumers may never 
be exposed to a broader set of new products. This problem has been considered by 
computer scientists looking at the algorithmic ‘black box’, yet rarely viewed as a problem 
addressable by marketing communications. Third, research on healthy eating has been 
dominated by how to improve the share of healthy choosers, leaving out a large proportion 
of cases in which consumers are deciding between two hedonic options that do not 
qualitatively yet quantitatively differ in healthiness. To fill these gaps, this dissertation 
uncovers the intricate influence of language on consumer dishonesty (Chapter 2), develops 
framing of recommendation as a tool to maximize consumer traffic to recommendations of 
novel products (Chapter 3), and pinpoints the self-control dynamic when consumers are 
choosing between the vice and the lesser vice (Chapter 4). By doing so, these essays take a 
step further in realizing the potential of consumer research to advance the collective 
welfare of consumers. Meanwhile, the advancement is accompanied by greater benefits to 
companies, in terms of the management of losses incurred by dishonest consumers, 






De wereld waarin consumenten leven raakt in toenemende mate geglobaliseerd, 
gedigitaliseerd en verzadigd met verleidingen. Dit zorgt ervoor dat consumenten omringd 
zijn door meerdere talen, geautomatiseerde aanbevelingen en reminders over hun 
gezondheid. Er is veel onderzoek gedaan om te begrijpen hoe consumenten hun weg 
vinden in deze wereld, door te kijken naar de manier waarop zij producten beoordelen en 
besluiten nemen in verschillende talige contexten, op welke manier de beste aanbevelingen 
aan individuele gebruikers kunnen worden gegenereerd, en hoe consumenten kunnen 
worden aangezet tot een gezond voedingspatroon. 
Ondanks de overvloed aan onderzoek op deze gebieden stel ik dat er meer onderzoek 
nodig is om het welzijn van consumenten als collectief te bevorderen. Ten eerste is er 
weliswaar uitgebreid onderzoek gedaan naar (on)ethisch gedrag en tweetaligheid als 
afzonderlijke gebieden, maar beide onderwerpen zijn maar zelden aan elkaar verbonden. 
Ten tweede dragen geautomatiseerde aanbevelingen weliswaar enorm bij aan nieuwe 
ontdekkingen door consumenten, maar het fenomeen geeft ook aanleiding tot de 
bezorgdheid dat consumenten nooit worden blootgesteld aan een breder scala van nieuwe 
producten. Dit probleem is bestudeerd door computerwetenschappers die zich bezig 
houden met de algoritmische ‘zwarte doos’, maar wordt zelden gezien als een probleem 
dat kan worden aangepakt door marketingcommunicatie. Ten derde wordt onderzoek naar 
gezonde voeding gedomineerd door de vraag hoe het aandeel van mensen dat gezonde 
keuzes maakt kan worden vergroot. Daarbij wordt een groot deel van de gevallen buiten 
beschouwing gelaten waarin consumenten tussen twee hedonistische opties kiezen die qua 
gezondheid niet kwantitatief maar wel kwalitatief van elkaar verschillen. Om deze hiaten 
op te vullen wordt in dit proefschrift de complexe invloed blootgelegd die taal heeft op de 
oneerlijkheid van de consument (hoofdstuk 2). Verder wordt een framing van 
aanbevelingen ontwikkeld als instrument om consumentenverkeer naar aanbevelingen van 
nieuwe producten te maximaliseren (hoofdstuk 3) en wordt de dynamiek van 
zelfbeheersing getoond wanneer consumenten kiezen voor de minste van twee kwaden 
(hoofdstuk 4). Hiermee gaan deze essays een stap verder in de realisatie van de 
mogelijkheden van consumentenonderzoek om het collectieve welzijn van consumenten te 




bedrijven met betrekking tot het beheer van verliezen veroorzaakt door oneerlijke 
consumenten, de betrokkenheid van consumenten bij aanbevelingen en de marketing van 
minder ongezonde producten. 
Hoofdstuk 2: Taal en oneerlijkheid van consumenten 
Consumenten liegen en bedriegen in sterk uiteenlopende domeinen, bijvoorbeeld als 
het gaat om verzekeringsclaims, het retourneren van producten, datingprofielen en 
belastingaangiftes. Hoewel de meeste consumenten liegen in hun moedertaal (L1), liegen 
ze ook in hun tweede taal (L2): reizigers geven informatie verkeerd weer wanneer ze 
formulieren voor verloren bagage invullen; immigranten geven geen informatie over 
medische aandoeningen aan ziektekostenverzekeraars; en buitenlandse consumenten 
claimen kortingen door middel van een valse online-identiteit.  
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik het effect van taal (L2 vs. L1) op liegen. Negen studies, 
betrekking hebbend op verschillende talen en consumptiedomeinen, stellen de bevindingen 
van recent psychologisch onderzoek ter discussie die erop wijzen dat het gebruik van een 
tweede taal leidt tot minder liegen. Het gebruik van een tweede taal leidt niet in alle 
gevallen tot meer eerlijkheid, maar zwakt eerder de intuïtieve voorkeur af die mensen 
hebben voor liegen of het vertellen van de waarheid. Verder wordt het effect van taal 
vergroot door sterkere intuïtieve neigingen naar (on)eerlijkheid. Ook draagt een extra groot 
gevoel van onzekerheid in tweedetaalcontexten bij aan het effect van taal op de 
oneerlijkheid van consumenten. Deze genuanceerde bevindingen markeren het feit dat 
taalcontexten oneerlijk gedrag niet automatisch activeren of remmen. In plaats daarvan is 
het de wisselwerking tussen de morele intuïtie, die ten minste gedeeltelijk is gevormd in de 
context van de moedertaal, en de onzekerheid die eigen is aan het gebruik van een vreemde 
taal, die het effect van taal vormgeeft.  
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt nieuwe inzichten in fenomenen die van groot belang zijn voor 
managers en beleidsmakers. Liegen komt in talloze situaties voor en om vele verschillende 
redenen. Ik richt me op opportunistische leugens die materiële voordelen opleveren voor 
consumenten. Hoewel leugens die niet-materiële voordelen opleveren (bijv. 
impressiemanagement) ook vaak voorkomen, zijn met name leugens die zijn gemotiveerd 




voor organisaties, overheden en eerlijke consumenten. Ik richt me ook met name op 
private lying; dat wil zeggen, liegen in situaties waarin geen sprake is van face-to-face 
communicatie. De bovengenoemde condities kenmerken een groot deel van het 
misleidende consumentengedrag dat voorkomt in computergestuurde omgevingen. Het 
bestuderen van het effect van taal onder deze omstandigheden draagt bij aan een beter 
begrip van de eerlijkheid van de consument in het digitale tijdperk. 
Hoofdstuk 3: Framing van aanbevelingen voor het aantrekken van meer click-
throughs 
Veel bedrijven geven consumenten productaanbevelingen die zijn gegenereerd door 
algoritmische aanbevelingssystemen: Spotify en Netflix raden liedjes of films aan en 
TripAdvisor en Yelp geven aanbevelingen voor hotels of restaurants. Amazon doet 
suggesties welke producten consumenten mogelijk zouden willen kopen, en The New York 
Times beveelt verschillende nieuwsartikelen aan. Deze gepersonaliseerde aanbevelingen 
helpen consumenten bij het vinden van aanbod waarin ze waarschijnlijk geïnteresseerd zijn 
en zorgen voor meer loyaliteit.  
Om de nauwkeurigheid van deze algoritmische aanbevelingen te verbeteren, hanteren 
aanbevelingssystemen vaak een hybride aanpak die rekening houdt met zowel 
gemeenschappelijke voorkeuren van consumenten als gemeenschappelijke kenmerken van 
producten. Elke aanbeveling is dus gebaseerd op input over zowel gebruikers als 
producten; het is niet eenvoudig in woorden uit te leggen waar de aanbeveling op 
gebaseerd is. Sommige bedrijven geven reeds aan dat hun aanbevelingen user-based zijn, 
door de nadruk te leggen op de overlap tussen consumentenvoorkeuren, zoals 
“Consumenten die dit product bekeken, bekeken ook …” van Amazon en “Klanten 
bekeken ook …” van Netflix. Sommige andere bedrijven benadrukken daarentegen dat 
aanbevelingen item-based zijn, zoals “Vergelijkbaar met [waar je naar hebt geluisterd]” 
van Spotify en “More in Health” van The New York Times.  
Dit leidt tot de vraag welke vorm van framing van aanbevelingen, user-based of item-
based, effectiever is bij het triggeren van clicks. Mijn centrale stelling is dat user-based 
framing, in vergelijking met item-based framing, de consument laat weten dat de 




product is vergelijkbaar met het gekozen product) maar ook wijst op taste matching tussen 
gebruikers (het gekozen product dat je leuk vindt, wordt ook leuk gevonden door andere 
gebruikers). Consumenten halen informatie uit voorkeuren van vergelijkbare anderen om 
hun eigen waardering van onbekende producten te voorspellen. Deze informatie moet de 
klant dus een extra garantie bieden dat het product aansluit bij de eigen voorkeuren. Om 
deze reden voorspel ik dat aanbevelingen die zijn geframed als user-based (in tegenstelling 
tot item-based) meer click-throughs genereren, als de consument tenminste de indruk heeft 
dat de aanbevelingen goed aansluiten bij de eigen voorkeuren.  
Ik test mijn stelling met zes onderzoeken die verschillende soorten gegevens (veld-, 
gedrags- en scenario-gebaseerd onderzoek) en consumptiedomeinen (artikelen, schilderijen 
en boeken) beslaan. Bij deze verschillende methoden en productdomeinen vind ik steeds 
dat user-based framing voor meer click-throughs op aanbevelingen zorgt dan item-based 
framing, wanneer consumenten de indruk hebben dat de voorkeuren van anderen met die 
van henzelf overeenkomen. Ik stel verder drie randvoorwaarden voor die er voor kunnen 
zorgen dat de ontvanger van de aanbeveling de taste matching als niet succesvol ervaart, 
waardoor het voordeel van de user-based framing ten opzichte van de item-based framing 
afneemt. Deze randvoorwaarden zorgen op hun beurt voor belangrijke handvatten voor 
bedrijven over hoe de framing van hun aanbevelingen kan worden aangepast om het aantal 
click-throughs te maximaliseren. Belangrijk is dat de aanbevelingen in al deze 
onderzoeken betrekking hebben op producten waarmee de consument niet bekend is. Dit is 
een ontwerpelement dat inzicht verschaft in de manier waarop de totale consumptieve 
diversiteit kan worden vergroot en hoe nieuwe producten op de markt gebracht kunnen 
worden. 
Hoofdstuk 4: Wanneer de goede keuze de minst slechte is 
Om overgewicht en obesitas te bestrijden, is er een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid 
onderzoek gedaan naar de drijvende krachten achter de keuzes van consumenten tussen 
gezonde en ongezonde voeding, vaak ook wel goede en slechte keuzes genoemd. Het 
meeste onderzoek over zelfbeheersing met betrekking tot voedselkeuzes is gebaseerd op 




Hoofdstuk 4 vult deze literatuur aan door te kijken naar een weinig onderzochte 
setting waarin consumenten kiezen tussen een ongezond voedingsproduct (bijv. gewone 
chips) en een iets minder ongezonde versie ervan (bijv. light chips). In dergelijke situaties 
kiezen consumenten dus tussen slecht en minder slecht, in plaats van tussen goed en slecht. 
Het bestuderen van deze context is van groot praktisch belang, omdat minder slechte 
keuzes in overvloed aanwezig zijn in de markt, zoals kaascrackers met minder vet en 
suikervrije chocola. Deze producten bevatten normaal gesproken minder calorieën terwijl 
ze qua smaak zo veel mogelijk op het gewone product proberen te lijken.  
De belangrijkste bijdrage van hoofdstuk 4 is dat het laat zien dat keuzeconflicten 
tussen slechte en minder slechte keuzes worden gekenmerkt door hun eigen dynamiek. Ten 
eerste worden keuzes tussen slecht en minder slecht veel minder gekenmerkt door het 
verschil in directe behoeftebevrediging. Ten tweede is het verschil in calorische dichtheid 
het enige opvallende verschil in de setting ‘slecht versus minder slecht’. Deze voorgestelde 
verschillen zijn gebaseerd op goal systems theory en leiden tot twee voorspellingen. Een 
van de voorspellingen heeft betrekking op de zinloosheid van interventies die bedoeld zijn 
om de slechte keuze minder aantrekkelijk te laten lijken. Ik beargumenteer dat de 
toevoeging van een vertraging tussen keuze en consumptie, een populaire nudging-tactiek 
in de richting van gezond eten, in de keuzesetting ‘slecht versus minder slecht’ niet meer 
genoeg is om het perspectief van de consument te verleggen van directe 
behoeftebevrediging naar welzijn op de lange termijn. Het ruim van tevoren maken van 
voedselkeuzes zou er dan niet voor zorgen dat er minder slechte keuzes worden gemaakt. 
Daar tegenover staat mijn voorspelling dat consumenten die zich structureel meer 
bezighouden met calorie-inname meer geneigd zijn om voor de minder slechte keuzes te 
gaan. Het derde kenmerk van de keuzesetting ‘slecht versus minder slecht’ is dat de 
geconsumeerde hoeveelheden van belang zijn voor het algehele succes van zelfbeheersing. 
Met het oog hierop schets ik de concurrerende voorspellingen over de manier waarop 
keuzes invloed uitoefenen op geconsumeerde hoeveelheden.  
Om deze stellingen te testen heb ik twee experimenten uitgevoerd waarin het moment 
van keuze werd gemanipuleerd, individuele verschillen in terughoudendheid bij het eten 




daadwerkelijke keuzes en geconsumeerde hoeveelheden werden vastgelegd. De 
onderzoeken bevestigen de voorspellingen door te laten zien dat het loskoppelen van de 
directe bevrediging van voedselkeuzes door van tevoren te bestellen er niet toe leidt dat 
consumenten de slechte keuze vervangen door de minder slechte keuze; in plaats daarvan 
zorgen individuele verschillen in de mate waarin men zich bezighoudt met de calorie-
inname voor de keuze voor het vervangende product. Belangrijk is ook dat de onderzoeken 
aantonen dat consumenten slechts beperkte controle uitoefenen over de geconsumeerde 
hoeveelheden nadat ze een keuze hebben gemaakt. Deze bevindingen worden besproken in 
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